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GARNISHMENT IN VIRGINIA
Traditionally, the process of garnishment has been available to a
creditor at two stages of a legal proceeding to accomplish two dis-
tinct purposes. Before judgment, the defendant's property in the
hands of a third person could be placed within the custody of the
law to await a final determination of the suit, providing security
for debts or costs. The process also could be used in aid of execu-
tion of a judgment in favor of the creditor, to reach property held
by a third person to satisfy the lien created by the judgment.
Under the Virginia statutory scheme,1 the term "garnishment" 2 is
used exclusively to denote the postjudgment proceedings in aid of
execution; the general term "attachment" describes garnishment
1. VA. CODE §§ 8.01-511 to 525 (Rep. Vol. 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
2. In its broadest sense, garnishment is a term used to describe any of several statutory
procedures whereby a plaintiff may reach assets of a defendant in the hands of a third
party. The word "garnishment" is derived from the Norman French word "garnir," meaning
to warn. Lynch v. Johnson, 196 Va. 516, 84 S.E.2d 419 (1954). Hence, the summons of gar-
nishment is a warning to the garnishee not to deliver or dispose of the assets of the judg-
ment debtor in his hands, upon threat of personal liability should he do so.
The origin of the garnishment concept has been traced to a commercial action established
in the trading centers of medieval London known as "foreign attachment," a legal device
with similarities to both modern garnishment and attachment procedures. See C. DRAKE,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SUITS BY ATTACHMENT §§ 1-4 (2d ed. 1858); Musman & Riesenfeld,
Garnishment and Bankruptcy, 27 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1942); Comment, Wage Garnishment-
The Contemporary Shylock's Pound of Flesh, 40 Miss. L.J. 151 (1968). Foreign attachment
was a process designed to provide the plaintiff with security for an unpaid debt from a
nonresident debtor by attaching the property of such debtor in the hands of a third person.
Musman & Riesenfeld, supra, at 8 n.21.
The remedy of foreign attachment flourished in England prior to its introduction to colo-
nial America. The earliest statute on this subject in Virginia was passed in 1744 and may be
found at 5 W HENING, STATUTES AT LARGE 220 (Richmond 1819). Kelso v. Blackburn, 30 Va.
(3 Leigh) 323, 330 (1831). The early Virginia statutes contemplated a suit in foreign attach-
ment in chancery; this remedy was granted to a creditor against a debtor who was absent
from the state when the debtor had an estate or debts due to him in the county where the
suit was brought. 1 J. MATTH.WS, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 113 (Richmond 1856).
See generally Pulliam v. Aler, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 54 (1859); Erskine v. Staley, 39 Va. (12
Leigh) 417 (1841); Templeman v. Fauntleroy, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 434 (1825).
The early statutes dealing with foreign attachment, however, were not the precursors of
the modern garnishment process in Virginia. Rather, the substantive legislative changes giv-
ing rise to this process occurred some one hundred years later. For further delineation of
these statutory developments, see notes 6-15 infra & accompanying text.
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before judgment. Garnishment in Virginia is the process whereby a
judgment creditor enforces the lien of a writ of fiert factass against
any debt or property due the judgment debtor and in the posses-
sion of a third party, the garnishee.4 It is substantially an action at
law in which the judgment creditor is subrogated to the rights of
the judgment debtor against his debtor, the garnishee.
The primary objective of this Note is to survey the practical and
procedural aspects of the garnishment process in Virginia. The dis-
cussion will be limited to the general topic of garnishment and will
not include allied remedies such as the basic executionary process
or attachment. To this end, federal legislation in the area also will
be considered, because of its tremendous impact on the Virginia
garnishment statutes.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
At common law, the writ of fiert factas commanded a sheriff to
take the amount of money mentioned in the writ out of the tangi-
ble personal property of the person against whom the judgment
had been rendered.6 The laws of Virginia before July 1, 1850, re-
flected this common law tradition. Thus intangible personal prop-
erty, termed generally "choses in action,"'7 could not be subjected
to levy and public sale under a writ of fieri facias, nor was the writ
a lien on such personalty; it therefore could not be reached to sat-
isfy the creditor's judgment.'
3. See note 5 infra & accompanying text.
4. In re Cruff, 280 F Supp. 846, 848 (W.D. Va. 1968); Lynch v. Johnson, 196 Va. 516, 520,
84 S.E.2d 419, 421 (1954).
5. See Ayres v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 172 Va. 383, 394, 2 S.E.2d 303, 307 (1939);
Levine's Loan Office v. Starke, 140 Va. 712, 714, 125 S.E. 683, 684 (1924).
6. A. FREEMAN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EXECUTIONS IN CIVIL CASES § 7 (1885); 3 W
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *417; see Riesenfeld, Enforcement of Money Judgments in
Early American History, 71 MICH. L. REV. 691, 709-12 (1973); Riesenfeld, Collection of
Money Judgments in American Law - A Historical Inventory and a Prospectus, 42 IOWA L.
REV. 155, 177-78 (1957).
7. A chose in action is defined generally as a personal right not reduced to possession, but
recoverable by a suit at law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 305 (4th ed. 1968). Hence, all the
personal estate of the debtor of which he is not currently in possession, including debts of
all kind due to him, is included in the term "choses in action."
8. The Lien of The Writ of Fieri Factas in Virginia, 2 VA. L. REG. 704, 705 (1897). See 1
REV. CODE OF VA., ch. 134, § 1 (1819). The writ of fien facias became a lien only on the
goods and chattels of the debtor that were capable of being levied on at the time the writ
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In 1849 a substantial revision of the Code of Virginia was under-
taken. It was enacted that, effective July 1, 1850, the writ of iert
facias would be a lien on all the debtor's intangible personal prop-
erty 9 This new and extensive lien became effective against the in-
tangible personalty from the time the writ was delivered to the
sheriff for execution;10 because the lien was not inchoate or condi-
tional,11 nothing more was required than delivery to the sheriff to
make it valid and binding. Furthermore, the new lien did not ter-
minate with the passing of the return date, but continued in force
until the right of the judgment creditor to levy a new execution
ceased.12
The garnishment process was devised as the means by which the
debtor's intangible personal property, now subject to the compre-
hensive lien of the writ of fieri facias, could be made available to
the creditor in satisfaction of his judgment. 3 Garnishment merely
afforded the judgment creditor a direct remedy against a third
party, who in some way was indebted to the judgment debtor, to
insure that the lien of execution was enforced effectively.
The early case of Charron & Co. v. Boswell"' confirmed the sup-
was delivered to the sheriff.
9. See CODE OF VA. § 3601 (1887). The 1887 version of the statute differs in no essential
part from the text originally enacted 1850. See CODE OF VA., ch. 188, § 3 (1860).
10. Frayser's Adm'r v. Richmond & A. R.R., 81 Va. 388, 392 (1886); Charron & Co. v.
Boswell, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 216, 221-22 (1868); Puryear v. Taylor, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 401, 408
(1855).
11. In re Acorn Elec. Supply, Inc., 348 F Supp. 277, 280 (E.D. Va. 1972). In contrast, the
effectiveness of a lien against tangible property depended on a levy being made before the
return date of the writ. 2 VA. L. REG., supra note 8, at 706.
12. Trevillian's Ex'rs v. Guerrant's Ex'rs, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 525, 529-30 (1879); Puryear v.
Taylor, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 401, 408 (1855). In Trevillian, the court held that the lien of a
writ of ien facias upon a debtor's choses in action, although not asserted in the lifetime of
the debtor or the creditor, is not defeated or impaired by the death of either or both, and
may be enforced by the appropriate statutory remedies. 72 Va. at 531.
13. With the creation of the garnishment process the Code revisors intended to provide as
effective a remedy as was previously available through use of the writ of caplas ad satis-
factendum, which was abolished in 1850. Puryear v. Taylor, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 401, 407
(1855). Prior to 1850, the writ of capias ad satisfactendum was the only procedure by which
a creditor could reach the unleviable property of the debtor. Under that writ, the execution
was made against the body of the debtor, who was imprisoned until his discharge under the
insolvency laws, at which time title to all his unleviable property became vested by opera-
tion of law in the creditor. Id. See also Note, Body Attachment and Body Execution: For-
gotten but Not Gone, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 543 (1976).
14. 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 216 (1868).
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plementary nature of the garnishment process as a proceeding in
aid of execution. In Boswell, certain creditors were able to have
their garnishment summons served on the garnishee first even
though their judgment had been rendered at a date later than that
of certain other creditors. They contended that by the garnishment
process they acquired a special lien on the funds in controversy
that entitled them to preference over the other creditors. In re-
jecting this contention, the court stated, "Now this view is wholly
inconsistent with the purpose and effect of the [garnishment] pro-
ceedings [they] do not give any lien at all, general or specific.
They are merely a means provided by law for the enforcement of a
legal lien which already exists.' 15
The court in endowing the writ of fieri facias with power to bind
mere choses in action, made the garnishment remedy a more hu-
mane alternative to debtor's prison, and completed the framework
of Virginia's modern execution of judgment statutes. The garnish-
ment process in Virginia has remained substantially unchanged
since its inception in 1850.
NATURE AND EFFECT OF GARNISHMENT
At the outset, an understanding of the nature and effect of the
process of garnishment is essential. As has been noted, in Virginia,
the term "garnishment" refers exclusively to the exercise of that
remedy in aid of execution; therefore, the existence of a prior, valid
judgment is presupposed."6 Garnishment is the process by which a
judgment creditor enforces the lien created by the writ of fiert
facias issuing out of that judgment against any debt or other chose
in action due his judgment debtor in the hands of a third person,
the garnishee.'7
Garnishment is a proceeding that exists only by virtue of statu-
15. Id. at 223-24.
16. Though a judgment regular on its face is presumed to be valid, a judgment debtor
may challenge the validity of the judgment against him by entering a motion to quash the
garnishment proceedings. VA. CODE § 8.01-477 (Repl. Vol. 1977). For further discussion of
the grounds for the effect of filing a motion to quash, see notes 280-94 infra & accompany-
ing text.
17. Lynch v. Johnson, 196 Va. 516, 520, 84 S.E.2d 419, 421 (1954); Ayres v. Harleysville
Mut. Cas. Co., 172 Va. 383, 394, 2 S.E.2d 303, 307 (1939); Levine's Loan Office v. Starke, 140
Va. 712, 714, 125 S.E. 683, 684 (1924).
[Vol. 21:793
1980] GARNISHMENT IN VIRGINIA 797
tory enactment,' and cannot be enforced beyond the scope of the
statute in order to fit the exigencies of a particular case.' The pro-
ceeding is regarded generally as in derogation of common law and
therefore the judgment creditor must follow strictly the procedure
outlined in the statute.20 The garnishee likewise cannot safely
waive compliance with any of the statute's substantive provisions,
or honor a judgment in an unauthorized garnishment proceeding
and thereby absolve himself of liability Any volunteered acts on
the garnishee's part will be regarded as void to the extent they
interfere with the rights of third parties.21
Though supplementary to and in aid of a judgment, a garnish-
ment proceeding in Virginia is an independent civil action,22 rather
than a summary execution process. In the 1853 case of Tunstall v.
Worthington,23 the court remarked,
The proceeding must be regarded as a civil suit, and not as
a process of execution to enforce a judgment already rendered.
In this proceeding the parties have a day in court; an issue
of fact may be tried by a jury, evidence adduced, judgment ren-
dered, costs adjudged, and execution issued on the judgment.2 4
18. Lynch v. Johnson, 196 Va. 516, 520, 84 S.E.2d 419, 421 (1954).
19. Bickle v. Chrisman's Adm'x, 76 Va. 678, 691 (1882).
20. J. ROOD, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF GARNISHMENT § 6 (1896). In the administration of
statutory law, the standards of construction are far more limited in number and range than
if a general principle of law was involved. A statute is a positive enactment made by a power
competent in itself to make law and that power is presumed to know the full meaning of the
terms it employs. 1 VA. L.J. 705, 706 (1877). But see J. ROOD, supra, §§ 8-11.
21. Bickle v. Chrisman's Adm'x, 76 Va. 678, 691 (1882).
22. Levine's Loan Office v. Starke, 140 Va. 712, 714, 125 S.E. 683, 684 (1924); Rollo v.
Andes Ins. Co., 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 509, 513 (1873). The sole authority cited m Virginia cases
for the proposition that the proceeding in garnishment in aid of execution is a civil suit in
the legal conception of that terminology is C. DRAKE, supra note 2, § 452. Drake, in turn,
relies principally on two older Alabama cases: Moore v. Stainton, 22 Ala. 831 (1853); Travis
v. Tartt, 8 Ala. 574 (1846). See also J. ROOD, supra note 20, § 3.
Although the Virginia cases relying on Drake have embraced his authority without ques-
tion, the concept of the garnishment process as an independent suit is proper in light of the
wide latitude accorded the Virginia courts in determining the existence and the extent of
the liability involved. See notes 86-88 infra & accompanying text. In many other jurisdic-
tions, garnishment proceedings are regarded as summary in nature and a court may not
resolve disputes as to liability. See, e.g., Cornelius v. Albertson, 244 N.C. 265, 93 S.E.2d 147
(1956).
23. 24 F Cas. 324 (C.C.D. Ark. 1853) (No. 14,239).
24. Id. at 325.
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Thus, a proceeding in garnishment is substantially an action at law
by the judgment debtor in the name of the judgment creditor
against the garnishee.25
In such proceedings, the judgment creditor alleges that a debt of,
or property in the hands of, the garnishee is due to the judgment
debtor. Therefore, the principal objective is to ascertain whether
there is, or was, such indebtedness, and, if so, its amount.26 If the
garnishee denies any indebtedness to the judgment debtor or the
judgment creditor alleges that the garnishee has not fully disclosed
his liability, the court, without any formal pleading, must inquire
into the liability of the garnishee;27 the issue then becomes the ex-
istence and the extent of such liability, and the judgment creditor
carries the affirmative burden of proof. On demand by either party,
the court is authorized to impanel a jury to determine this issue.28
In addition, when an adverse claim to the alleged indebtedness ex-
ists, the adverse claimant may be joined by order of court at any
stage of the proceeding and the validity of his claim may be
adjudicated.29
A fundamental doctrine of the law of garnishment is that the
judgment creditor acquires no rights against the garnishee greater
than the judgment debtor himself possesses."0 Consequently, a pre-
sent, fixed liability of the garnishee is necessary to render him lia-
ble in the garnishment proceeding.3l A garnishee is not chargeable
unless the judgment debtor can recover from him what the creditor
seeks to secure by garnishment. In order to hold the garnishee lia-
ble, the creditor must show that the legal obligation for the debt is
absolute and not subject to some future contingency or dependent
25. Lynch v. Johnson, 196 Va. 516, 521, 84 S.E.2d 419, 422 (1954); Ayres v. Harleysville
Mut. Cas. Co., 172 Va. 383, 394, 2 S.E.2d 303, 307 (1939); Rollo v. Andes Ins. Co., 64 Va. (23
Gratt.) 509, 512-13 (1873); C. DRAKE, supra note 2, § 452; J. ROOD, supra note 20.
26. Fentress v. Rutledge, 140 Va. 685, 687, 125 S.E. 668, 669 (1924).
27. Id. at 687-88, 125 S.E. at 669.
28. VA. CODE §§ 8.01-519, -565 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
29. Jetco, Inc. v. Bank of Va., 209 Va. 482, 486-87, 165 S.E.2d 276, 279 (1969); see notes
62-64 infra & accompanying text.
30. C. DRAKE, supra note 2, § 458; see A. FREEMAN, supra note 6, §§ 159-60. This doctrine
results from the conception of the garnishment process as an action by the judgment debtor
in the name of the judgment creditor against the garnishee. See notes 24-25 supra & accom-
panying text.
31. See note 34 infra. See also C. DRAKE, supra note 2, § 460.
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upon an unperformed condition precedent.3 2 Courts have held,
however, that when a debt has a present existence, although paya-
ble at some future date, it is subject to the lien of a writ of fierf
facias and may be reached by garnishment.3 3
The issue of whether a present, fixed liability exists that may be
reached by a creditor in satisfaction of his judgment has been the
subject of much litigation in Virginia.3 4 Boisseau v. Bass Adminis-
trator 5 is the Virginia case offering the most thorough discussion
of this issue. In Boisseau, the judgment creditor sought to hold an
insurance company liable as garnishee for the proceeds of a life
insurance policy on the life of one R.T. Bass, contending that her
writ of fieri facias constituted a subsisting and continuing lien on
all the personal estate of the debtor, including the insurance pol-
icy 36 In rejecting the creditor's claim for the proceeds, the court
noted that payment of the premiums was a condition precedent to
any right of the insured to claim under the policy and that such
payments were entirely voluntary 3 7 The court concluded that the
insurance contract did not constitute a present fixed liability upon
the company to pay anything, nor did it create any present indebt-
edness that the insured could demand. Until the insured's death,
the policy was liable to forfeiture for nonpayment of the premi-
32. Fentress v. Rutledge, 140 Va. 685, 688, 125 S.E. 668, 669 (1924); Frietas v. Griffith &
Boyd, 112 Va. 343, 345, 71 S.E. 531, 532 (1911); Boisseau v. Bass' Adm'r, 100 Va. 207, 210,
40 S.E. 647, 649 (1902).
33. C. DRAKE, supra note 2, § 551; A. FREEMAN, supra note 6, § 165. See Boisseau v. Bass'
Adm'r, 100 Va. 207, 210-11, 40 S.E. 647, 649 (1902); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Gallahue's
Adm'rs, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 655, 665-66 (1855).
34. See, e.g., Jetco, Inc. v. Bank of Va., 209 Va. 482, 165 S.E.2d 276 (1969); Lynch v.
Johnson, 196 Va. 516, 84 S.E.2d 419 (1954); Ayres v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 172 Va. 383,
2 S.E.2d 303 (1939); Combs v. Hunt, 140 Va. 627, 125 S.E. 661 (1924); Fentress v. Rutledge,
140 Va. 685, 125 S.E. 668 (1924); Boisseau v. Bass' Adm'r, 100 Va. 207, 40 S.E. 647 (1902);
Bickle v. Chrisman's Adm'x, 76 Va. 678 (1882); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Gallahue's Adm'rs,
53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 655 (1855); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. McCullough, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 595
(1855); Brockenbrough v. Ward's Adm'r, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 352 (1826).
35. 100 Va. 207, 40 S.E. 647 (1902).
36. Id. at 208, 40 S.E. at 648. Under the terms of the policy, payment of a fixed premium
was required for a period of twenty years. Bass died before the expiration of the twenty-year
period, yet well after the return date of the writ of garnishment. Id. at 209-10, 40 S.E. at
648-49.
37. Id. at 210, 40 S.E. at 649.
38. Id. The court had relied previously on A. FREEMAN, supra note 6, §§ 164-65, as au-
thority for its conclusion that no present fixed liability existed.
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urns; therefore, whether an obligation to pay ever would rest upon
the company by reason of such policy was questionable.3 9
Similarly, in Lynch v. Johnson,40 a case involving a dispute over
the proceeds of a fire insurance policy, the court held that if the
judgment debtor had no right to demand payment in whole or in
part from the insurance company for his own benefit, his creditor
likewise is not entitled to garnish the proceeds. The evidence
demonstrated that the destroyed property had been conveyed to
the judgment debtor, with the grantor reserving a life estate for
herself. The policy insured the entire value of the property for the
benefit of all persons having an interest in it. The court held that
under these facts, the debtor had no individual claim to the pro-
ceeds of the policy; hence, his creditor could not reach them.41
In conclusion, a judgment creditor seeking to garnish any in-
debtedness due to the judgment debtor from any source must com-
ply with the appropriate statutory procedures. He must allege, and
be prepared to prove, the existence of a present fixed liability on
the garnishee's part to the debtor as a prerequisite to obtamnmg the
issuance of a writ of garnishment.
PARTIES TO THE GARNISHMENT PROCEEDINGS
No judgment against the garnishee is possible unless the creditor
has secured a valid judgment against his debtor.42 Once a valid
39. 100 Va. at 210, 40 S.E. at 649.
40. 196 Va. 516, 84 S.E.2d 419 (1954).
41. Id. at 524, 84 S.E.2d at 424. The court noted that when a person insures his own
interest in property in his own right and at his own expense, he is entitled to the insurance
proceeds, and the owner of any other interest in that property has no claim to the proceeds.
Id. at 523, 84 S.E.2d at 423. See Morotock Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 93 Va. 8, 24 S.E. 464 (1896).
Here, however, the property was insured for the benefit of all persons having an interest
therein. Further, an agreement made contemporaneously with execution of the deed stated
that any insurance proceeds received from the property would be used exclusively for its
restoration.
The court went on to state that, even if the judgment debtor was individually entitled to
some portion of the proceeds, the evidence did not establish what amount of money was due
to him. Because no definite portion was alleged, the creditor had no right to garnish any of
the proceeds. 196 Va. at 524, 84 S.E.2d at 424.
42. C. DRAKE, supra note 2, § 460; see In re Acorn Elec. Supply, Inc., 348 F Supp. 277,
281 (E.D. Va. 1972); Shackelford v. Apperson, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 451 (1849); Henley's Case, 3
Va. 145 (1805). VA. COD § 8.01-504 (RepI. Vol. 1977) provides that if notice of a lien of a
writ of fien facias is served on a defendant (presumably, including a garnishee) when no
800 [Vol. 21:793
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judgment has been rendered in the creditor's favor, the lien ac-
quired on the debtor's intangible personalty in the possession of a
third person remains in force for one year from the date of the
final determination of the amount owed.43 During this period, the
number of garnishment writs the judgment creditor may sue out to
obtain satisfaction is unlimited44; that the creditor may avail him-
self of the benefit of other statutory remedies will not impair his
lien.45 The proceeding by interrogatory is one additional remedy
available to the judgment creditor to compel any person to answer
such questions as may be advanced by the creditor or judge to as-
certain whether any personal estate of the debtor is m that per-
son's posseession. 4' The statute provides, however, that when a
judgment creditor seeks to have an employer withhold payment of
a debtor's wages or salary, he must do it through a garnishment
proceeding,47 presumably to give the debtor the maximum benefit
of the safeguards and exemptions which accompany the
proceeding.
Having been found liable to the creditor, the judgment debtor's
entire personal estate, including all debts from whatever source, is
available for the creditor's satisfaction, subject to any statutory ex-
emptions afforded for his protection.48 The creditor's lien existing
on the debtor's intangible personalty, however, may be defeated by
an assignee who pays valuable consideration and takes without no-
judgment exists against the defendant, both the plaintiff causing such service and the officer
actually serving the notice shall pay the defendant $100 plus whatever other damages are
proved. As to the availability of an action for wrongful garnishment, see notes 280-91 infra
& accompanying text.
43. VA. CODE § 8.01-505 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
44. Id. § 8.01-475; see Richardson v. Wymer, 104 Va. 236, 51 S.E. 219 (1905); Puryear v.
Taylor, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 401 (1855). The right to issue numerous executions cannot be
used to unnecessarily oppress or injure the debtor. Sutton v. Marye, 81 Va. 329 (1886). The
right to issue multiple garnishment summons is limited further when the judgment creditor
seeks to garnish a judgment debtor's wages or salary. See notes 70, 207 infra & accompany-
ing text.
45. VA. CODE § 8.01-425 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
46. Id. §§ 8.01-506 to 510 (Repl. Vol. 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1979). The statute has been
amended recently to provide that a party may file an affidavit requesting the production of
books of accounts or other writings in possession of the debtor or a person not a party to the
proceedings. Id. § 8.01-506.1.
47. Id. § 8.01-503.
48. Id. § 8.01-501.
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tice of the lien,49 even when the debtor intended to commit a fraud
in making the assignment.50
The garnishee's position in the garnishment process has been de-
scribed as that of a "mere stakeholder" or "custodian" of the
debtor's effects in his hands.5 1 This characterization is not totally
accurate, however, when the garnishment process is viewed as a
separate civil proceeding. 2 Once served with a notice of garnish-
ment, the garnishee is actually the defendant in the separate pro-
ceeding. If he fails to respond and pay the correct amount to the
court, he may be compelled to appear or face contempt proceed-
ings as well as a direct suit by the creditor for costs the creditor
may have incurred because of the garnishee's resistance.5 3 The gar-
nishee can escape all personal liability by surrendering into the
custody of the court the money or other effects due to the debtor."
Any person who owes money to the judgment debtor or has any
of the debtor's property in his possession or control may be sub-
jected to liability as a garnishee and directed to make a compul-
49. Id., see Virginia Mach. & Well Co. v. Hungerford Coal Co., 182 Va. 550, 29 S.E.2d 359
(1944); Charron & Co. v. Boswell, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 216 (1868); Evans v. Greenhow, 56 Va.
(15 Gratt.) 153 (1859). Evans v. Greenhow was the first case interpreting the language per-
taining to assignment, which was included in the original draft of the statute in 1849. The
court in Evans found that the proper scope of this new and extensive lien was limited so
that it should do no injury to the rights of others. 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) at 159-60.
50. Shields v. Mahoney, 94 Va. 487, 27 S.E. 23 (1897). In Shields, the court held that an
insolvent debtor could, notwithstanding his insolvency, make a valid assignment of a chose
in action owned by him, and the bona fide assignee for value of such chose in action takes
title superior to the lien of fieri facias against the debtor. If the assignee has no notice of
any intent by the debtor to commit fraud, such intent is immaterial. Id. at 490-91, 27 S.E. at
24.
51. Bickle v. Chrisman's Adm'x, 76 Va. 678, 691 (1882); see Lynch v. Johnson, 196 Va.
516, 520, 84 S.E.2d 419, 422 (1954). The garnishee also has been described as an agent of the
court, entitled to hold the property until the question of his liability is determined, and not
at liberty to exercise any acts of ownership over it. Erskine v. Staley, 39 Va. (12 Leigh) 406
(1841); C. DRAKE, supra note 2, § 453.
52. See notes 22-25 supra & accompanying text.
53. VA. CODE §§ 8.01-519, -564 (Repl. Vol. 1977). In Bickle v. Chrisman's Adm'x, 76 Va.
678, 691 (1882), the garnishment process was described as:
differing in no essential particular from attachment by levy, except as is said
that the plaintiff does not acquire a clear and full lien upon the specific prop-
erty in the garnishee's possession, but only such a lien as gives him the right to
hold the garnishee personally liable for it or its value.
Id. See C. DRAKE, supra note 2, §§ 450, 456.
54. Bickle v. Chrisman's Adm'x, 76 Va. 678, 692 (1882).
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sory assignment for the creditor's benefit. The term "person" is
construed broadly to include corporations, 55 partnerships, 5 unin-
corporated associations,5" and any other entity having legal recog-
nition or existence. Furthermore, Virginia is in a minority of juris-
dictions that permit a municipality to be sued as a garnishee in
certain actions other than those expressly provided by statute."
The 1899 Virginia case of Portsmouth Gas Co. v. Sanford" inter-
preted the then-recent abolition of sovereign immunity with re-
spect to garnishment of the wages and salaries of municipal and
state employees60 as indicating a shift in public policy allowing for
the garnishment of debts owed by municipal corporations. Re-
cently, Portsmouth has been interpreted narrowly, and its holding
has been restricted to "an ordinary debt to a third person" when
"little inconvenience and no prejudice can result to the city ",1
55. VA. CODE § 8.01-468 (Repl. Vol. 1977); see Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Gallahue's Adm'rs,
55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 563 (1858).
56. When two or more persons are jointly indebted to the judgment debtor, the general
rule is that they must be joined as garnishees. See, e.g., Lyon v. Ballentine, 63 Mich. 97, 29
N.W. 837 (1886). The Virginia Code, however, provides: "When a judgment is against sev-
eral persons jointly, executions thereon may be joint against all of them." VA. CODE § 8.01-
469 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (emphasis supplied). Therefore, when one seeks to garnish a debt
owing from a partnership to the debtor, under Virginia law, a summons properly can be
served on only one of the partners.
57. VA. CODE § 8.01-15 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See generally Yonce v. Miner's Mem. Hosp.
Ass'n, 161 F Supp. 178 (W.D. Va. 1958).
58. The weight of authority favors the view that municipal corporations and their officers
who hold property to which others are entitled are not liable to the creditors of such persons
through a garnishment proceeding. 17 E. MCQUILLIN, LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §
49.86 (3d ed. 1968); Note, A Changing Public Policy: Garnishment of Municipal Corpora-
tions in Ilinois-Henderson v. Foster, 25 DEPAUL L. REv. 745 (1976). For an examination
of the reasoning used by courts in applying public policy considerations to exempt munici-
pal corporations from garnishment, see City of Roosevelt Park v. Norton Townslnp, 330
Mich. 270, 47 N.W.2d 605 (1951); Welsh Lumber Co. v. Carter Bros. & Bird, 78 W. Va. 11,
88 S.E. 1034 (1916).
59. 97 Va. 124, 33 S.E. 516 (1899). See also Hicks v. Roanoke Brick Co., 94 Va. 741, 27
S.E. 596 (1897).
60. By an act approved in 1898, the wages and salaries of officials, clerks and employees
of a municipal corporation may be subjected to garnishment when a judgment has been
rendered against such persons. In a separate act, this right was extended to the wages and
salaries of all state employees. Portsmouth Gas Co. v. Sanford, 97 Va. 124, 127, 33 S.E. 516,
517 (1899). See also Knight v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 182 Va. 380, 29 S.E.2d 364 (1944). For a
discussion of current statutes relating to garnishment of the wages and salaries of municipal
and state employees, see notes 181-92 infra & accompanying text.
61. Slaughter v. Winston, 347 F Supp. 1221, 1222 (E.D. Va. 1972), afl'd per curtam, 476
F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1973). In Slaughter, a person who had been awarded a judgment against
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Finally, it is well settled that a court may not adjudicate the
rights of a nonparty 6 2 Consequently, in a garnishment proceeding,
the rights of a third party claimant to the funds sought to be gar-
nished cannot be adjudicated unless he is a party to that proceed-
ing.63 The Virginia Code is liberal in its provision for adding new
parties at any stage of the proceeding as justice may require.6
THE VIRGINIA STATUTORY SCHEME
Initiation of Garnishment Proceedings
To obtain issuance of a garnishment summons, the judgment
creditor must suggest to the court, either orally or in writing, that,
because of the lien of his writ of fiert facias,6 5 some person other
than the judgment debtor is liable or that some person has, m his
capacity as personal representative of some decedent,6 6 a sum of
the city sergeant in his official capacity, for having been subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment, sought to garnish the operating funds appropriated by City Council for the city
sergeant's office. The court, however, found that the city was not a "mere stakeholder" of
such funds; rather, the funds sought to be garnished were the means of paying expenses
incurred in performance of a municipal function, and the city's statutory obligation to con-
tribute such funds would remain even if garnishment was permitted. Therefore, garnish-
ment of these funds would have been contrary to public policy and was precluded by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id. at 1222-23.
62. Jetco, Inc. v. Bank of Va., 209 Va. 482, 486, 165 S.E.2d 276, 279 (1969).
63. Id. The court in Jetco suggested that, alternatively, the garnishment proceeding could
have been suspended until a suit had been instituted to determine the validity of the third
party's claim. Id. at 487, 165 S.E.2d at 280. In the interest of preventing duplication of
actions, determination of the claim in the course of the garnishment proceeding seems the
preferable solution.
64. VA. CODE § 8.01-5 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See generally McDaniel v. North Carolina Pulp
Co., 198 Va. 612, 95 S.E.2d 201 (1956); Hogan v. Miller, 156 Va. 166, 157 S.E. 540 (1931).
65. In Virginia, the lien created on the debtor's intangible personal property by the writ
of fieri facias continues for one year from the return day of the execution or from the deter-
mination of the amount owed by a third person to the debtor, whichever is longer. VA. CODE
§ 8.01-505 (Repl. Vol. 1977). The lien ceases when the right to enforce the judgment ceases,
see id. § 8.01-251, or is suspended by a forthcoming bond being given and forfeited, by
supersedeas, or by other legal process. Id. § 8.01-505. See M. BURKS, COMMON LAW AND
STATUTORY PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 372 (4th ed. 1952).
66. Before 1932 Virginia did not permit garnishment of an executor or administrator to
recover a legacy or distributive share because the proper remedy was in a court of equity.
See, e.g., Bickle v. Chrisman's Adm'x, 76 Va. 678 (1882); 2 T. HARRISON, WILLS AND ADMIN-
ISTRATION §§ 538-42 (2d ed. 1961). That year, however, the statute was amended to allow the
process of garnishment to lie against the personal representatives of a debtor of the judg-
ment debtor.
1980] GARNISHMENT IN VIRGINIA
money to which the judgment debtor is or may be entitled as cred-
itor or distributee of such decedent.6 7 The judgment creditor also
must specify in his suggestion the amount of interest due on the
judgment and any credits made toward satisfaction of the judg-
ment.6 In addition, when the judgment creditor seeks to garnish
the wages or salary of the judgment debtor, no summons will issue
at his suggestion of liability unless he makes one of six allegations
enumerated in the statute.69 Frequently, the net effect of this pro-
vision is to prohibit for eighteen months the issuance of a second
garnishment summons on a different judgment secured by the
judgment creditor against the same judgment debtor.0
Following the judgment creditor's suggestion of liability, a sum-
mons7 1 may be sued out of the clerk's office of the court in which
the judgment was rendered or to which an execution thereon has
been returned against such person.72 In Virginia, service of the
summons on both the garnishee and the judgment debtor is
mandatory and the proceedings cannot continue until such notifi-
cation is given.73 The statute, however, provides that when service
cannot be made on the judgment debtor in the customary fash-
ion,74 the clerk may send a copy of the summons by first class mail
67. VA. CODE § 8.01-511 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
68. Id.
69. Id. See note 207 infra & accompanying text.
70. A. PHELPS, HANDBOOK OF VIRGINIA RULES OF PROCEDURE IN ACTIONS AT LAW 271 (3d
ed. 1974); See M. BURKS, supra note 65, § 374 (Supp. 1961).
71. The summons is to be substantially in the form prescribed in VA. CODE § 8.01-512
(Cum. Supp. 1979). The substantive restrictions and definitions of the federal wage garnish-
ment law are contained on the face of this model summons. After July 1, 1980, the summons
issued must be identical in form to the statutory model. Id. § 8.01-512.1.
72. Id. § 8.01-511 (Cum. Supp. 1979). See td. § 16.1-99 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (providing for
return of the writ of fiert facias within ninety days to the general district court from which
it issued).
73. Id. § 8.01-511 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The statute reads in pertinent part- "The summons
shall be served on the garnishee, and shall be served on the judgment debtor." This lan-
guage reflects the principle, lying at the foundation of Virginia's judicial system, that an
individual has the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. Dorr's Adm'r v. Rohr, 82
Va. 359, 362 (1886). See also Fultz v. Brightwell, 77 Va. 742 (1883); Underwood v. McVeigh,
64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 409 (1873). The Virginia Supreme Court, however, has held that when the
summons has been duly served on the garnishee, he is properly before the court, and no
additional notification of the time of the hearing is necessary. Jetco, Inc. v. Bank of Va., 209
Va. 482, 488-89, 165 S.E.2d 276, 280-81 (1969).
74. Service ordinarily is made in the manner prescribed in VA. CODE § 8.01-296(1), (2)
(Repl. Vol. 1977).
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to the debtor's last known address. 5
When the garnishee is a corporation, the garnishment statute
provides that the exclusive mode of service of the summons is on
an officer or managing employee of the corporation. 6 The sum-
mons can be served on the registered agent or the clerk of the
State Corporation Commission only if the judgment creditor files a
certificate stating that he has used due diligence and that no such
officer or managing employee could be found within the state.7
When the garnishee is the United States government, the sum-
mons is to be served on the managing employee of the agency al-
leged to be liable, or, if the judgment debtor is a member of the
armed forces, service is made on the chief fiscal officer of the mili-
tary post to which the debtor is assigned.78 Service of the summons
may be made on a United States Attorney or other agent when it
cannot be made on the persons designated in the statute.79 Finally,
of significance is that the wages and salaries of federal employees,
including servicemen, are subject to garnishment only for the lim-
ited purpose of collection of legal obligations to provide child sup-
port and alimony 80
Examination of the Garnishee, Judgment, and Costs
The garnishee, after receipt of the summons, either must appear-
in person and be examined under oath, or must file a statement,
verified by affidavit, setting forth the amount of his indebtedness
to the judgment debtor or what property he holds to which the
debtor is entitled;81 a corporation must appear through its author-
75. Id. § 8.01-511 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The statute states that the judgment creditor shall
file a certificate setting forth the last known address of the debtor and furnish the clerk with
an envelope with first-class postage attached. In addition, the creditor is to furnish the
debtor's social security number, if known, which shall appear on the summons. Id.
76. Id. § 8.01-513 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
77. Id. The mode of service prescribed here is in contrast to the general provisions dealing
with service of process on corporations set out at id. §§ 8.01-299, -301.
78. Id. § 8.01-523.
79. Id. Service on the United States Attorney or other agent is to be made in the manner
set forth in FED. R. Civ. P 4(d)(4). See note 314 infra & accompanying text.
80. 42 U.S.C.A. § 659 (West Supp. 1979). For a discussion of the garnishment of federal
employees for alimony and child support obligations, see notes 295-324 infra & accompany-
ing text.
81. VA. CODE § 8.01-515 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The Virginia statute provides the garnishee
with the option to deliver or pay what he is liable for to the officer serving the summons or
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ized agent or have that agent file a statement, verified by his affi-
davit."2 If either the judgment debtor or judgment creditor dis-
putes the accuracy of the statement, the garnishee can be
compelled to make an appearance and be required to produce such
books and papers as are necessary.8 3
When the garnishee is before the court as the personal represen-
tative of a decedent, he must file a written answer stating whether
any sum of money is in his hands in his fiduciary capacity owing to
the judgment debtor and, if so, the amount.8 4 If the amount has
not been determined definitely, the court must continue the case
and direct the garnishee to report to the court when this amount is
ascertained and payable to the debtor.8 5
When the suggestion is made to the court that the garnishee has
not fully disclosed his liability in his answer, the court, without
any formal pleading, will inquire into the mdebtedness88 or, if the
proceeding is in a circuit court, will impanel a jury to make the
inquiry if a demand is made by either party.8 7 The evidence ad-
duced by the judgment creditor clearly must establish the exis-
tence of the indebtedness or property in the garnishee's hands.
The garnishee may be examined as an adverse witness, but this
alone will not discredit his testimony nor justify a verdict against
him if unsupported by the evidence.88
When the verified statement or examination of the garnishee
discloses his liability to the judgment debtor, the court may render -
to the clerk issuing it, before the return day of the summons, and thereby avoid making an
appearance or filing a verified statement. Id. § 8.01-520 (RepL. Vol. 1977).
Furthermore, notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 8.01-515, -516, an employer may pay
his employee wages or salary when due, not exceeding the amount exempted by the federal
garnishment restrictions as codified m VA. CODE § 34-29 (Cum. Supp. 1979). He then must
file a written statement to this effect, stating the amount so paid, and pay the excess of the
wages or salary over the exemption into court and be discharged of any liability to the
employee for the wages or salary so withheld. Id. § 8.01-517 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
82. Id. § 8.01-515 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
83. Id.
84. Id. § 8.01-518 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
85. Id.
86. Id. §§ 8.01-519, -565.
87. Id. § 8.01-519 states that when the summons is before a general district court, the
court shall proceed without a jury.
88. Huff v. Huff, 143 Va. 46, 49-50, 129 S.E. 219, 220 (1925); see Levine's Loan Office v.
Starke, 140 Va. 712, 715-16, 125 S.E. 683, 684 (1924). See also Eastern Shore Produce Exch.
v. Belote, 138 Va. 707, 123 S.E. 372 (1924).
1980]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:793
judgment against him for the amount due and order its delivery to
the judgment creditor, a designated officer, or have the amount
paid into court.8 9 Judgment as to costs will be made against such
party as the court deems just,90 but no such judgment may be
made against the garnishee unless he fails to make appearance or
fails to fully disclose his liability 91
When the garnishee fails to make an appearance or file a state-
ment, the court may either compel him to appear or, in his ab-
sence, hear proof of any liability on his part and make appropriate
orders as if the proof had appeared by his examination.2
STATUTORY ExEMPTIONS
The Federal Wage Garnishment Law: Title III
On July 1, 1970, Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act
(CCPA)93 went into force, bringing the subject of garnishment of
89. VA. CODE § 8.01-516 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
90. Id. § 8.01-521.
91. Id. Where the garnishee delivers or pays what he is liable for before the return day of
the summons, there shall be no judgment against him for costs.
92. Id. §§ 8.01-519, -564.
93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1676 (1970), as amended, (West (U.S.C.A.) Supp. 1979). The re-
strictions on garnishment contained in Title III are predicated on the powers granted the
Congress m article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution to regulate commerce and
to establish uniform bankruptcy laws. Id. § 1671(b).
Within the scope of the commerce clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, Congress' power to
regulate commerce is plenary in nature. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). As disclosed in § 1671 of the CCPA, Con-
gress found that unrestricted or inadequately restricted wage garnishments affect interstate
commerce m two ways: first, such garnishments encourage undesirable credit extension
thereby diverting money into excessive credit payments, away from the payment of goods
and services, hindering production and the flow of goods in interstate commerce; second,
wage garnishments are related to employee discharges, which affect both production and
consumption of goods. Congress also based its authority for the enactment of Title III on
the bankruptcy clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. Chicago, R.I.& P Ry., 294 U.S. 648 (1935).
These findings make clear that Congress had a rational basis for determining that the
CCPA was needed to exercise its constitutional power to regulate commerce and establish
uniform bankruptcy laws. Hodgson v. Hamilton Mun. Court, 349 F Supp. 1125, 1131 (S.D.
Ohio 1972); Hodgson v. Cleveland Mun. Court, 326 F Supp. 419, 429 (N.D. Ohio 1971). The
courts therefore are obligated to accept these findings without further judicial review. Kat-
zenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964). See also United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S.
63, 66-68 (1965); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 466 (1943). Title III therefore appears
to be a valid exercise of the constitutional power vested in Congress. For cases holding other
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an employee's wages under federal control. Before this time, the
garnishment process had been the exclusive concern of state and
local tribunals. Congress clearly indicated by the language of the
legislation that it did not intend to preempt the entire field of gar-
nishment law.9 4 Rather, it limited its exercise of federal supremacy
to two areas: first, the maximun amount that may be garnished
from the earnings of an individual for any week or other pay pe-
riod that has been subjected to garnishment;95 second, a prohibi-
tion against discharge of an employee because his earnings have
been subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness. 6
Congress intended that the federal law would preempt any pro-
vision of a state law authorizing garmshment of a greater percent-
age of an employee's wages than is permitted under Title III1 7
Stated differently, as between the CCPA and state law, whichever
is more restrictive and results in a smaller garnishment will control
in any given situation. Thus, the effect of the Title III provisions
is to create a statutory minimum exemption on wage garnishments,
while leaving the several states free to enact more stringent
exemptions.
Background
An overview of the purposes that Congress sought to accomplish
titles of the CCPA constitutional, see United States v. Perez, 426 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir. 1970);
United States v. Biancofiori, 422 F.2d 584 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 942 (1970). For
an rn-depth discussion of the constitutionality of Title II[, see Note, Federal Restrictions of
Wage Garnishment: Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 44 IND. L.J. 267
(1969).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1677 (1970); Hodgson v. Hamilton Mun. Court, 349 F Supp. 1125, 1132
(S.D. Ohio 1972). Section 1677 provides as follows:
This subchapter does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person from
complying with, the laws of any State
(1) prohibiting garnishments or providing for more limited garnishment
than are allowed under this subchapter, or
(2) prohibiting the discharge of any employee by reason of the fact that Ins
earnings have been subjected to garnishment for more than one indebtedness.
Id.
95. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1673 (West 1974 & Supp. 1979).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (1970).
97. Hodgson v. Hamilton Mun. Court, 349 F. Supp. 1125, 1133 (S.D. Olo 1972); Gerry
Elson Agency v. Muck, 509 S.W.2d 750, 751-52 (Mo. App. 1974).
98. First Nat'l Bank v. Columbia Credit Corp., 179 Colo. 242, 245-46, 499 P.2d 1163, 1164
(1972); Willhite v. Willhite, 546 P.2d 612, 616 (Okla. 1976).
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by the enactment of Title III of the CCPA is critical to an under-
standing of the legislation. Creditors frequently have resorted to
the process of garnishment of a debtor's wages to secure payment
for outstanding debts.9 Although justified on the ground that its
abolition would lead to a tightening in the credit market,100 gar-
nishment has been criticized severely as a collection device, both
because of its potentially drastic effects on the individual debtor 01
and those close to him, and because of the attendant social cost
involved when the state is used as a collection agency.10 2 Title III
represents a congressional effort to strike a balance between these
conflicting considerations. 103
Discharge of a garnished debtor from employment is one com-
mon consequence of wage garnishment.1°0 The garnishment process
99. Socioeconomic changes m American society have generated different patterns of debt
and' a changed social attitude toward indebtedness. See D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN
TROUBLE 5 (1974); Comment, Wage Garnishment, supra note 2, at 154-57. The trend today
is increasingly toward the use of consumer credit. The volume of consumer credit has grown
from $5.665 billion in 1945 to $56.028 billion in 1960 and to $121.346 billion in 1970. 50
SURVEY OF CURRENT BusiNUss 5-17, 5-18 (July 1970). The level of debt as of July 1979 was
$295.05 billion, having risen 16.2 percent in one year. N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1979, at D1, col.
5.
The liberal use of wage garnishments to collect these obligations has produced serious
adverse consequences for the individuals affected and for society as a whole. Those creditors
who engage in high-risk credit operations usually are extending credit to individuals whose
only asset is their periodic earnings; thus, the availability of wage garnishment as a collec-
tion device is a major reason for their willingness to extend credit to these individuals. See
D. CAPLOVITZ, supra, at 27-46, 233-36; Note, Wage Garnishment Under the Consumer
Credit Protection Act: An Examination of the Effects on Existing State Law, 12 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 357, 358 (1970).
100. James & Fragomen, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: Inadequate Remedies
Under Articles V and VI, 57 GEO. L.J. 923, 938 (1969).
101. See Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommendations, 53
CAuTP. L. REV. 1214, 1234-38 (1965); Note, Wage Garnishment in Kentucky, 57 Ky. L.J. 92,
113 (1968); Note, Garnishment Under the Consumer Credit Protection Act and the Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 338, 350 (1969).
102. Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1, 30
(1969). Note, Wage Garnishment Under the Consumer Protection Act, supra note 99, at
359.
103. As originally introduced, the bill would have provided for a blanket prohibition
against the garnishment of wages. Testimony received, however, indicated that a total prohi-
bition would unduly restrict honest and ethical creditors, while permitting those fully capa-
ble of paying their debts to escape such responsibilities. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1967), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962, 1978.
104. The likelihood of discharge is greater when an unskilled or semiskilled worker is
involved, because the replacement costs are significantly less; unfortunately, these workers
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has become essentially a tripartite procedure that compels the
debtor's employer to incur significant bookkeeping expense and in-
convenience in processing the required papers. Therefore, after one
or more garnishment summons are served on an employer, he often
will dismiss the employee.105 The loss of employment not only
eliminates the discharged employee's ability to provide adequate
financial support for himself and his dependents, but also imposes
a substantial burden on society. A prospective employer will be re-
luctant to hire an individual who has been discharged previously
because of garnishment difficulties. Unable to find new employ-
ment, the debtor will be forced to resort to welfare compensation,
the cost of which is passed on to the public.10
The increase in wage garnishments in this country in the last
several years has been paralleled by a dramatic rise in the number
of personal, nonbusiness bankruptcy petitions filed.107 To an em-
ployee beset by financial difficulties, the prospect of filing for per-
are most likely to have their wages garnished. Note, Wage Garnishment Under the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act, supra note 99, at 359. Also conceivable, however, is that the
employer will lose the services of a more highly trained worker if that worker is unable to
perform effectively while burdened by his financial problems. Note, Wage Garnishment in
Kentucky, supra note 101, at 117.
105. Note, Wage Garnishment in Kentucky, supra note 101, at 117. Whereas at one time
a garnishee was only an incidental party to the garnishment remedy as a mere custodian of
the debtor's goods, he now has become a principal participant in the proceeding. Ths in-
crease in importance in turn has given rise to increased legal responsibility; the garnishee
now may face personal liability for his failure to comply with the procedural requirements.
Comment, Wage Garnishment, supra note 2, at 160; see Comment, Wage Garnishment in
New York State: Practical Problems of the Employer, 34 ALB. L. REV. 395, 418-22 (1970).
106. See Comment, Wage Garnishment, supra note 2, at 161; Note, Wage Garnishment
Under the Consumer Credit Protection Act, supra note 99, at 359.
107. D. CAPLOVrrZ, supra note 99, at 2; Comment, Wage Garnishment, supra note 2, at
159. As the House report for the CCPA discloses, personal bankruptcy declarations rose
from 18,000 per year in 1950 to 208,000 per year in 1967. H.R. REP. No. 1040, supra note
103. The number of personal bankruptcies dropped to 182,210 for the year ending June 30,
1977. R. KIRKs, ANNUAL REPORT: A DmiNsTRATIVm OFFICE oF Tm UNITED STATES CouRTs 131
(1977). The recent decline in the number of bankruptcy petitions filed on a nationwide basis
may be misleading. The bankruptcy court that handles cases from Southeastern Virginia
received 223 petitions in July 1979, which amounted to a fifty percent increase over the
number filed in July 1978, and twice the total for July 1977. Norfolk.Ledger-Star, Aug. 30,
1979, at 1, col. 5. For an excellent article discussing the relationship between the use of wage
garnishments and the number of nonbusmess bankruptcies, see Brunn, supra note 101, at
1234-38. See also Countryman, The Bankruptcy Boon, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1452 (1964);
Shuchman & Jantcher, Effects of the Federal Minimum Exemption from Wage Garnish-
ment on Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Rates, 77 CoM. L.J. 360 (1972).
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sonal bankruptcy offers an attractive alternative. Bankruptcy dis-
charges the debtor from any unsecured obligations that cannot be
repaid from his liquidated estate and eliminates the possibility of a
deficiency judgment after repossession by secured creditors. 10 8 In
practice, however, a declaration of bankruptcy frequently results in
further aggravation of the debtor's financial distress, principally
because of the difficulty and expense of securing credit in the
future.109
Although wage garnishments are not the sole cause of bank-
ruptcy, the legislative history of Title III clearly shows that Con-
gress concluded that a close connection existed between un-
restricted state garnishment laws and declarations of personal
bankruptcy.110 In conjunction with the more overt evidence con-
cerning employee discharge following garnishment actions, Con-
gress felt that legislation curbing the disruptive effects of wage gar-
nishment was mandated. Against this background, the provisions
of Title III were enacted.
Substantive Provisions
Title III attempts to alleviate some of the adverse consequences
of wage garnishment by exempting a portion of an emplbyee's
earnings from garnishment and by curtailing the employer's ability
to discharge an employee whose wages have been garnished.111 The
basic intent of the wage exemption is to ensure that a wage earner
is able to maintain a decent standard of living in order to remain a
108. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524 (West Supp. 1979).
109. D. CAPLOVrrz, supra note 99, at 274-75; Note, Garnishment Under the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, supra note 101, at 350-51. The cost of bankruptcy, like other costs
generated by the garnishment process, is not borne by the debtor alone, but is partially
passed on to society. Nonbusiness bankrupticies now cost creditors well over one billion
dollars annually, a cost that the public absorbs through higher prices. Note, Wage Garnish-
ment Under the Consumer Credit Protection Act, supra note 99, at 360. Moreover, to the
extent that the administration of bankruptcy proceedings is funded by the public treasury,
it creates an additional financial burden on the public.
110. H.R. REP. No. 1040, supra note 103. In two states that prohibit garnishment of
wages, Texas and North Carolina, the bankruptcy rate was 5 to 9 persons per 100,000 popu-
lation per year, whereas in states with relatively harsh garnishment laws, such as California
and Ohio, the rate of personal bankruptcy ranged 200 to 300 persons per 100,000 popula-
tion. Id. See also Annot., 14 A.L.R. FED. 447 (1973).
111. See notes 95-96 supra & accompanying text.
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productive member of society.112
That Congress intended a broad application of Title III is
demonstrated by the definitions provided in section 1672.113 Con-
gress, in its definition of "garnishment," did not differentiate be-
tween the kinds of debts owed, nor did it restrict the term to a
specific withholding; on the contrary, garnishment includes "any
legal or equitable procedure.1114 These words, given a broad con-
struction, indicate that garnishment is not restricted, and includes
proceedings in aid of execution as well as prejudgment attachment
proceedings. 115
Similarly, the term "earnings"11 6 is used, rather than "wages" or
"salary," because it is broader and encompasses such payments as
commissions earned and money received from a business in which
112. Brunn, supra note 101, at 1228; see In re Kokoszka, 479 F.2d 990, 997 (2d Cir. 1973),
afl'd sub noam. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974).
113. Hodgson v. Christopher, 365 F. Supp. 583, 586 (D.N.D. 1973).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 1672(c) (1970) provides, "(c) The term 'garnishment' means any legal or
equitable procedure through which the earnings of any individual are required to be with-
held for payment of any debt."
115. Hodgson v. Hamilton Mun. Court, 349 F. Supp. 1125, 1139 (S.D. Ohio 1972). A court
order for the support of any person is a "garnishment" within the meaning of Title I if,
pursuant to that order, the earnings of an individual are required to be withheld to meet the
requirements of the order. Marshall v. District Court for Forty-First-b Jud. Dist., 444 F
Supp. 1110, 1116 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
Garnishment, as used in this section, does not include wage assignments that are brought
about by negotiation between a debtor and a creditor and subsequently implemented with-
out judicial intervention; a garnishment denotes a court proceeding whereby a creditor seeks
to reach an individual's earnings to satisfy a claim. Western v. Hodgson, 494 F.2d 379, 382-
83 (6th Cir. 1974). An assignment of wages, therefore, is not within the scope and protection
of Title III. This judicial interpretation of Title III is consistent with an opinion expressed
by the Wage Hour Administrator for the Department of Labor. See Wage-Hour Opinion
Letter No. 1154, 1 LAB. L. REP., Wages Hours (CCH) 22,501.6511 (Dec. 23, 1970). See also
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. A.T.& G. Co., 66 Mich. App. 359, 239 N.W.2d 614 (1976) (holding
that a garnishee is entitled to deduct from the disposable income of an employee any sum
previously agreed upon by the employee-debtor, with no limitation, as payments for a debt
owed by the employee to the employer; a garmshor-creditor of the employee can only claim
the difference, if any, between 25 percent of the employee's disposable earnings and the
garnishee's deductions). But see Moran, Relief for the Wage Earner: Regulation of Garnish-
ment under Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 12 B.C. Nmus. & COM. L. REv.
101 (1971) (suggesting that wage assignments may be used to circumvent the purposes of
Title I if "garnishment" is not construed broadly so as to encompass such agreements).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1672(a) (1970) provides, "(a) The term 'earnings' means compensation
paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission,
bonus, or otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement
program."
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the debtor is a participant.117 Both the language of the statute and
the legislative intent make clear, however, that "earnings" means
only periodic payments of compensation and does not include
every asset that is traceable in some way to such compensation.1, 8
Therefore, for the purpose of applying the percentage limitations
of Title III, courts have held that compensation loses its character
as "earnings" after it has been deposited in the employee's bank
account.u 9 Furthermore, a tax refund representing compensation
previously withheld does not become "earnings" when received by
the employee.1 20
117. S. MORGANSTERN, LEGAL PROTECTION IN GARNISHMENT AND ATTACHMENT 15 (1971). In
determining whether money due a person constitutes "earnings" under § 1672(a), the courts
are not concerned with labels such as wages, salaries or commissions. The sole criterion for
exemption is that the funds subject to garnishment represent compensation for personal
services in a strict sense. Gerry Elson Agency, Inc. v. Muck, 509 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Mo. App.
1974). The Missouri court in Muck held that a lessor of transportation equipment who, as
an independent contractor, received a fixed percentage of revenue derived from shipments,
did not receive any compensation for personal services and thus had no "earnings" within
the terms of Title III's protection. Id. at 755.
The Secretary of Labor is vested with authority to enforce the provisions of Title III, 15
U.S.C. § 1676 (1970), and accordingly, wage and hour opinion letters drafted pursuant to
that authority will be given substantial weight by the courts. Brennan v. Kroger Co., 513
F.2d 961, 964 (7th Cir. 1975). In re Cedor, 337 F Supp. 1103, 1108 (N.D. Cal.), affld per
curian, 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 973 (1973). See generally Public
Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958); United States v. Howard, 352 U.S. 212
(1957). The following are illustrative of administrative opinions on what constitutes "earn-
ings"" (1) tips that pass through the hands of the employer-garnishee, Wage-Hour Opinion
Letter No. 1142, 1 LAB. L. REP., Wages Hours (CCH) 1 22,501.158 (Dec. 9, 1970); (2) lump
sum payments to artists and writers, after a determination of the number of workweeks
spent on the product, Wage-Hour Opinion Letter No. 1127, id. 22,501.159 (Sep. 23, 1970);
(3) meals and lodgings provided under an employment contract, Wage-Hour Opinion Letter
No. 1142, id. $ 22,501.16 (Dec. 9, 1970); (4) sick pay, Wage-Hour Opinion Letter No. 1249,
id. 22,501.161 (Feb. 1, 1973).
118. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 651 (1974), citing and aff'g In re Kokoszka, 479
F.2d 990, 997 (2d Cir. 1973).
119. Dunlop v. First Nat'l Bank, 339 F Supp. 855 (D. Ariz. 1975). Accord, Usery v. First
Nat'l Bank, 586 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1978). The district court in Dunlop interpreted Title III
as governing the relationship between employer and employee. 399 F Supp. at 856. The
court stated that to assume that Congress intended to impose the significant burdens re-
quired to make exemption determinations on banks and other financial institutions was un-
realistic, especially because such institutions are not mentioned in the statute or the legisla-
tive history. Id. at 856-57, 858 n.12. See Phillips v. Bartolomie, 46 Cal. App. 3d 346, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 56 (1975).
120. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974). The Court held that a bankruptcy trustee
has the right to treat an entire tax refund to a bankrupt wage earner as property of the
bankrupt's estate regardless of the garnishment restrictions because a tax refund is not the
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"Disposable earnings," as defined in section 1672(b), is that por-
tion of earnings remaining after the deduction of amounts required
by law to be withheld. 121 The disposable earnings provision consti-
tutes a substantial change from prior state statutes in that most
wage exemptions before the federal legislation were computed on
gross earmngs. 2 2 Permissible deductions include withholding taxes
imposed by federal, state, or local governments and social security
payments; in addition, amounts withheld for unemployment com-
pensation and workmen's compensation insurance pursuant to
state law are also deductible.23 Union dues, credit union loan de-
ductions, or an employee's share of health and welfare benefit pay-
ments are not deductions required to be withheld by either federal
or state law and therefore are part of disposable earnings. 2 ' Fur-
thermore, the phrase "required by law to be withheld"1 25 does not
include any amount withheld pursuant to any court order for sup-
port of any person.1 2 6 At least one commentator1 27 has suggested
equivalent of "earnings" The Court concluded that Congress' purpose in enacting the stat-
ute was "to regulate garnishment in its usual sense as a levy on periodic payments of com-
pensation needed to support the wage earner and hns family on a week-to-week, month-to-
month basis." Id. at 651. A lump sum tax return, like a bank account, has neither an ele-
ment of periodicity nor the critical relationship to a person's subsistence that a paycheck
does. Id. at 648; accord, In re Kingswood, 343 F Supp. 498 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd per curam sub
nom. Kingswood v. Michelman, 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972), vacated, 418 U.S. 902 (1974);
cf. Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970) (per curtain) (vacation pay accrued but not paya-
ble at the time of filing does not pass to the bankruptcy trustee). Contra, In re Cedor, 337
F Supp. 1103, (N.D. Cal.), aff'd per curiam, 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 973 (1973).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1672(b) (1970) provides, "(b) term 'disposable earnings' means that part
of the earnings of any individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any
amount requred by law to be withheld."
122. S. MORGANSTERN, supra note 117, at 16.
123. 1 LAB. L. REP., Wages Hours (CCH) 1 22,501.15 (1979).
124. Wage Hour Opinion Letter No. 1063, id. 22,501.155 (Mar. 16, 1970).
125. See note 121 supra.
126. Marshall v. District Court for Forty-First-b Jud. Dist., 444 F Supp. 1110, 1115 (E.D.
Mich. 1978); First Nat'l Bank v. Hasty, 415 F. Supp. 170, 174 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd mem.,
573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977). The district court in Hasty was troubled by one consequence
of the defendant's contention that a support obligation is an allowable deduction: allowing
this deduction would establish a preference for divorced persons over married or separated
individuals who have similar expenses for dependent care. 415 F. Supp. at 173. See gener-
ally Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650-51 (1974); Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
183, 194 (1857).
127. Note, Garnishment Under the Consumer Credit Protection Act, supra note 101, at
343. Contra, Karwacki, Attachment of Wages in Maryland, 16 Mn. L. REV. 227, 238 (1956).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
that deductions to determine disposable earnings should include
such items as medical and hospital insurance premiums deducted
from an employee's pay
The amount of an individual's earnings subject to garnishment is
limited to the lesser of twenty-five percent of his disposable earn-
ings or the amount by which his weekly disposable earnings exceed
thirty times the federal minimum hourly wage.12 In contrast to the
flat dollar amount exemptions characteristic of most state laws, the
federal statute uses a percentage restriction coupled with a mini-
mum limitation to keep pace with changes in economic
conditions. 129
Because the current applicable minimum wage is $3.10 per
hour,1 30 the prescribed minimum would amount to $93 per week
and disposable income for any workweek, or lesser period, below
this amount would not be subject to garnishment. Weekly disposa-
ble earnings between $93 and $124 could be garnished for the full
amount in excess of $93, for that amount would always be less than
twenty-five percent of the disposable earnings. 31 For disposable
earnings above $124 per week, the amount subject to garnishment
would be computed by taking twenty-five percent of the earnings
because that sum would be less than the excess over $93.132 The
Secretary of Labor, pursuant to authority vested in him by Title
III,"'l transformed the weekly statutory exemption formula into a
formula that provides equivalent restrictions on wage garnishment
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (1970).
129. Note, The Implication of a Private Cause of Action Under Title III of the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act, 47 S. CAL. L. Rav. 383, 394 (1974); Note, Garnishment Under
the Consumer Credit Protection Act, supra note 101, at 344.
130. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a)(1) (West 1978) provides as follows:
(a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees wages at the fol-
lowing rates: (1) not less than $3.10 an hour during the year beginning
January 1, 1980, and not less than $3.35 an hour after December 31, 1980.
Id.
131. For example, if an individual had weekly disposable earnings of $120, the excess of
this amount over $93 would be $27, whereas twenty-five percent of $120 would be $30. If, on
the other hand, the weekly disposable earnings were $130, the twenty-five percent limitation
would apply because that amount minus $93 equals $37, whereas twenty-five percent of
$130 equals $32.50. When disposable earnings are $124, the difference between that amount
and $93 equals twenty-five percent of $124, or $31.
132. See note 131 supra.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (1970).
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for disposable earnings that compensate for personal services ren-
dered over a pay period of more than one week.
134
The above exemptions apply automatically; the debtor must ful-
fill no conditions precedent before he may receive the protection
that the statute affords.135 Section 1673(b), however, as amended
in 1977, provides for three specific exceptions 3 6 to the general re-
strictions on wage garnishment contained in Title III.1'7 First, the
restrictions do not apply when a garnishment order has been im-
posed by any federal court pursuant to Chapter XIII of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, nor do they apply in the case of a debt due for any
state or federal tax.138 Therefore, the entire amount of a debtor's
wages may be subjected to garnishment.
Second, the 1977 amendment changed the law with respect to
garnishments arising out of court orders for child support and ali-
mony. Before this amendment, a debtor's wages were subject to
unlimited garnishment to satisfy such support orders,13 9 which pre-
134. 29 C.F.R. § 870.10(c)(2) (1979) provides the following formula: the number of work
weeks, or fractions thereof x x 30 x the applicable Federal minimum wage, $3.10. For the
purpose of this formula, a calendar month is considered to consist of 4-1/3 work weeks. Thus,
the multiple applicable to the disposable earnings for a two week period is $186 (2 x 30 x
$3.10); for a monthly period, $403 (4-V/ x 30 x $3.10); and for a semimonthly period, $201.34
(2 -'/ 6 x 30 x $3.10). The multiple for any other pay period longer than one week is com-
puted in a manner consistent with the formula above. Id.
135. Note, Wage Garnishment Under the Consumer Credit Protection Act, supra note
99, at 364. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1673(c) (West Supp. 1979) expressly provides that "[n]o court of
the United States or any State may make, execute, or enforce any order or process in
violation of this section." See Higgins v. Wilkerson, 65 Lab. Cas. 1 52,523 (D. Kan. 1970).
Although the federal exemption law applied to all employees, the laws of the several states
often contain various qualifying conditions premised on residence, family status, type of
employment, or other factors. For a discussion of additional Virginia exemptions, see notes
176-93 infra & accompanying text.
136. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1673(b) (West Supp. 1979).
137. When any garnishment order exempt from the general restrictions of § 1673(a) ab-
sorbs more than twenty-five percent of an individual's weekly wages, an additional garnish-
ment within the same week apparently will be precluded.
138. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1673(b) (West Supp. 1979).
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1970). The problem of enforcement of child support and ali-
mony obligations has received much attention by Congress within the last decade. See S.
Rep. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. - (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 8133. The growing concern over this thorny problem rests in part on the legal and
moral considerations involved when parents capable of fulfilling such obligations disregard
their duty. Additional impetus has come from statistical data indicating that a large portion
of this financial burden, amounting to billions of dollars annually, is borne by the taxpaying
public. Phillips & Dworak, The Federal Garnishment Statute: Its Impact in the Air Force,
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sumably reflected Congress' conviction that absent parents should
be compelled to fulfill their court-ordered family responsibilities.
In its present form, subsection 1673(b)(2) represents a compromise
among competing interests: the enforcement of such support obli-
gations is balanced against the protection of a debtor whose wages
are subjected to garnishment. It now provides that fifty percent of
a debtor's disposable earnings is available for garnishment for
child support or alimony when the debtor is supporting another
spouse or dependents. If the debtor has no such current obligation,
sixty percent of his disposable earnings can be garnished. An addi-
tional five percent is to be added to the above percentages if there
are outstanding arrearages more than twelve weeks old.140
In addition to restrictions on amounts that may be subjected to
garnishment, Title III prohibits an employer from discharging an
employee because his earnings have been subject to garnishment
"for any one indebtedness."'" The employer is subject to a fine of
up to $1000 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both,
if he willfully violates this provision.142 But when an employee's
18 A.F.L. REV. 70, 70-71 (Winter, 1976)
The most comprehensive federal legislation on this subject to date is Part D of the Social
Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-660 (West Supp. 1979), which provides
for monetary and administrative assistance to state enforcement agencies. Also included in
this legislation is a section that provides for a limited waiver of federal governmental immu-
nity to allow for garnishment of all federal employees for collection of court-ordered support
obligations. Id. § 659. The mechanics of this section are discussed in detail in a later section
of this Note. See notes 295-324 infra & accompanying text.
140. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1673(b)(2) (West Supp. 1979).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1970). Prior to this federal legislation, an employee discharged
for service of a single garnishment summons on his employer had little recourse unless he
could show that the employer somehow had violated his rights under the federal labor laws.
See, e.g., Michigan Lumber Fab., Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 579 (1955). Under § 1674(a) discharge
of an employee whose wages have been subject to garnishments for more than one indebted-
ness ordinarily is permissible. One court has held, however, that the Civil Rights Act of 1964
limits an employer's right to discharge an employee whose wages have been subjected to
multiple garnishments, notwithstanding that § 1674(a) impliedly permits discharge in such
cases. Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971). A violation may
occur even when the discharge policy is adopted in good faith and with no intent to discrim-
inate, if the consequence is to subject a disproportionate number of minority group mem-
bers to discharge. Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974); accord, Gregory v.
Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972). See generally Annot., 26 A.L.R. FED. 394
(1976).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1674(b) (1970). The subjective motives of an employer might be difficult
to ascertain, leading to burden of proof problems in establishing the willfulness of the ac-
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wages have been garnished before the effective date of Title III,
this section will not prohibit an employer from discharging that
employee even though his wages have been garnished only once af-
ter the effective date.14 S
The phrase "one indebtedness" has been construed to mean a
single debt, regardless of the number of garnishment proceedings
instituted for its collection. 1" If a pending garnishment for one in-
debtedness fully absorbs the nonexempt portion of an employee's
wages, mere service on the employer of a second garnishment is
not justification for dismissal; the employer is not bound to make
deductions pursuant to the second summons because of the prior-
ity of the first. 4 5 The protection afforded under section 1674(a) is
renewed with each new employment because the new employer
would have suffered no inconvenience or expense as a consequence
of an earlier garnishment.Us The suggestion has been made that
discharge for a second garnishment may be unlawful when a con-
siderable period of time has elapsed since the first garnishment.147
Finally, Title III is significant in another respect: it is completely
devoid of any procedural guidelines. The absence of procedural
provisions indicates that Congress did not intend to alter existing
tion. Such determinations, however, have been common in other contexts. For example, the
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1973), prohibits an employer from
discharging an employee because of the employee's union membership or activities. See
Capital Elec. Power Ass'n, 171 N.L.R.B. 262 (1968), for an illustration of how such proof
problems are handled. The factual determination of an employer's motives for discharging
an employee of necessity must rest upon inference. Note, Federal Restrictions of Wage Gar-
nishment, supra note 93, at 278; see Brunn, supra note 101, at 1229-34.
143. Title HI does not purport to erase prior garnishments from the employee's record by
defining garnishment to mean garnishment after July 1, 1970, the effective date of the Act.
Cheatam v. Virginia Alcoholic Bev. Control Bd., 501 F.2d 1346 (4th Cir. 1974); accord,
Hodgson v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 503 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1974); Brennan v. General
Tel. Co., 488 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1973).
144. Wage-Hour Opinion Letter No. 1099, 1 LA. L. REP., Wages Hours (CCH) 1
22,501.612 (July 6, 1970).
145. Brennan v. Kroger Co., 513 F.2d 961 (7th Cir. 1975). "[T]he use of the present tense,
rather than the future tense, in the phrase 'are required to be withheld' [in § 1672(c)] sup-
ports a construction that in order for earnings to 'have been subjected to garnishment,'
those earnings must first be actually withheld pursuant to a garnishment order." Id. at 963
(emphasis supplied).
146. 1 LAB. L. RE., Wages Hours (CCH) 22,501.60 (1976).
147. Id., see Note, Garnishment Under the Consumer Credit Protection Act, supra note
101, at 348.
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state garnishment procedures other than by creating a statutory
minimum exemption standard. '"" State garnishment statutes thus
detail and regulate the procedural steps that a creditor must take
to subject the debtor's personal earnings to garnishment
proceedings.
Enforcement Provisins
Authority to enforce the provisions of Title III is vested in the
Secretary of Labor, who is directed to act through the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor.149 This grant of au-
thority must be read in light of the provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA),150 which regulates the activities of the
Wage and Hour Division. Under the provisions of the FLSA, the
Secretary has authority to initiate injunctive proceedings in the
federal courts. 151 Judicial interpretation of this power further has
implied a right to request reinstatement and reimbursement of lost
wages of an individual who has been discharged wrongfully 152 The
federal courts interpreting Title III thus far have held that it pro-
vides the right to similar remedial action.153 Although Title III ex-
pressly states that the Secretary of Labor shall enforce its provi-
sions,15 4 when read in conjunction with the FLSA, the Secretary's
power to initiate such action appears to be discretionary in
nature. 155
Despite the language of Title III, which grants enforcement
power of its provisions solely to the Secretary of Labor,' 56 author-
148. Note, Federal Restrictions of Wage Garnishment, supra note 93, at 276.
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1676 (1970).
150. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (West 1965, 1975, 1978 & Supp. 1979).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970).
152. See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 296 (1960); Goldberg v.
Bama Mfg. Corp., 302 F.2d 152, 155-66 (5th Cir. 1962); Mitchell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 278 F.2d 562, 564-65 (8th Cir. 1960).
153. Hodgson v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 503 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1974); Hodgson v.
General Tel. Co., 70 Lab. Cas. 1 32,827 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
154. 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970).
155. See Powell v. Washington Post Co., 267 F.2d 651, 652 (D.C. Cir.) (per curian), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 930 (1959). But see Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp., 350 F Supp. 1057
(W.D. La. 1972), vacated and remanded per curtain, 488 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1973) (empha-
sizing that the legislation itself specifies the Secretary of Labor as the party who shall en-
force the provisions of the CCPA).
156. See 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970).
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ity exists to support the argument that a private cause of action
should be implied as a supplementary means of debtor protec-
tion.151 One district court in the Fourth Circuit, however, has de-
termined that Congress neither provided for nor contemplated a
private cause of action based on Title 111. '5s The principal reason
cited by this court for its decision was that the criminal sanctions
and enforcement mechanism specifically articulated in Title III
constitute an adequate and effective remedy and obviate any need
for implying a private cause of action.159
157. The implication of a private civil remedy as an aid to enforcing federal statutes first
was recognized by the Supreme Court in 1916 in Texas & P Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39
(1916). Since that time, private causes of action for violations often have been implied, even
when criminal sanctions and administrative enforcement are expressly authorized. See, e.g.,
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections,
393 U.S. 544 (1969); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). But see Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66 (1975). See generally Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory
Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REV. 285 (1963); Symposium - Private Rights from Federal Statutes:
Toward a Rational Use of Borak, 63 Nw. U.L. Rav. 454 (1968).
In Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974), the court held that when an
employee had been discharged due to garnishment of his wages for a single indebtedness, a
private civil action was appropriate because the employee was within the class of persons
that the statute was designed to protect and his discharge was the type of harm the statute
was designed to prevent. Id. at 110. The court found that, although alternative remedies
existed under Title III, nothing on the face of the statute or in its legislative history evinced
a clear congressional intent to exclude private civil remedies. Id. at 111-12. Therefore, the
implication of appropriate civil remedies was justified to ensure the full effectiveness of the
purposes underlying the CCPA. Id. at 114; accord, Maple v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 437 F Supp. 66 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Nunn v. City of Paducah, 367 F. Supp. 957 (W.D.
Ky. 1973) (by implication) (mem.). For a discussion of the implication of a private cause of
action under Title III, see Note, Federal Restrictions of Wage Garnishment, supra note 93,
at 278-82; Note, Private Cause of Action, supra note 129, at 403-21.
158. Western v. Hodgson, 359 F Supp. 194 (S.D. W. Va. 1973), aff'd on other grounds,
494 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 1974); accord, Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp., 350 F Supp. 1057
(W.D. La. 1972), vacated per curiam on other grounds, 488 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1973); Old-
ham v. Oldham, 337 F Supp. 1039 (N.D. Iowa 1972) (relying on Jordon v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 442 F.2d 78 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971)); Higgins v. Wilkerson,
65 Lab. Cas. 5 32,379 (D. Kan. 1970); Hooter v. Wilson, 273 So. 2d 516, 519 (La. 1973).
159. Western v. Hodgson, 359 F Supp. 194, 200 (S.D. W Va. 1973), aff'd on other
grounds, 494 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 1974). The couA cited Breitwieser v. KMS Indus., Inc., 467
F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 969 (1973), as authority for the position
that the federal courts will permit litigants to enforce the provisions of federal statutes if a
federal right is clearly involved, but no federal remedy is available, or the federal remedy
provided is grossly inadequate: Id. Breitwieser addressed whether the child labor provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), created a private
cause of action for damages for wrongful death. The federal courts in both Western and
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Exemption for State-Regulated Garnishments
The federal restrictions on garnishment of wages imposed by Ti-
tle III are intended to supersede all state garnishment laws that
offer less protection to employees.160 Section 1675, however, autho-
rizes the Secretary of Labor to exempt from the operation of the
federal restrictions the garnishment provisions of any state statute
providing the same or greater restrictions on the garnishment of an
individual's earnings.' The exemption is available only from the
general restrictions contained in section 1673. No provision is
made for a state to obtain exemption from coverage of section
1674, which prohibits discharge for a garnishment arising out of a
single indebtedness.162
The regulations promulgated pursuant to section 1675 provide
that in assessing the merits of a state's application for exemption
the laws of the State shall be examined with particular regard to
the classes of persons and of transactions to which they may ap-
ply; the formulas provided for determining the maximum part of
an individual's earnings which may be subject to garnishment;
restrictions on the application of the formulas; and with regard
to procedural burdens placed on the indidivual whose earnings
Breitwieser held that the remedy provided by the statute at issue was adequate.
In contrast, the court in Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108, 112 (9th Cir. 1974),
stated that the mere existence of some enforcement mechanism was insufficient; rather the
issue was whether the statute's protection might be enhanced by allowing private civil relief.
The court considered the effectiveness of the criminal and administrative remedies now pro-
vided to be dubious. The remedies available pertained only to violations of the § 1674
wrongful discharge proscription, while no corresponding remedy was provided for garnish-
ment illegally in excess of the maximum allowed by § 1673. The criminal sanctions covered
only willful violations; negligent violations were untouched, and the burden involved in
proving willfulness might be an onerous one. Id. at 113. Furthermore, application of the
enforcement authority vested in the Secretary of Labor is discretionary, not mandatory,
causing doubt that an adequate remedy exists because it is contingent on some positive
action from an already overburdened administrative agency. See Note, Private Cause of
Action, supra note 129, at 398-99. Finally, the enforcement scheme provided is society's
remedy for deterring future violations while the violation of the statutory duty owed to the
jobless individual goes unvindicated. Breitwieser v. KMS Indus., Inc., 467 F.2d at 1394-95
(Wisdom, J., dissenting).
160. See notes 93-98 supra & accompanying text.
161. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1675 (West Supp. 1979).
162. Note, Wage Garnishment Under the Consumer Credit Protection Act, supra note
99, at 368-69.
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are subject to garnishment.1 3
The basic test for exemption, however, is whether the state statute
is "substantially similar" to the provisions of the federal legisla-
tion.6 4 Under this standard, consideration is limited to the provi-
sions of state laws that can be compared with Title Ill, whereas
supplementary state provisions are not considered. 6 5
To date, of the dozen states'66 that have made application for
exemption, only the statutes of Virginia'16 7 and Kentucky6 8 have
been found "substantially similar" so as to qualify for exemption
from Title III's general restrictions on wage garnishment. 69 The
Virginia General Assembly has adopted the restrictions of section
1673 verbatim et literation,110 including the 1977 amendments
163. 29 C.F.R. § 870.51(b) (1979). For a compilation of the procedural requisites to apply
for state exemption, see id. §§ 870.52 to .55. Provision also is made for the exemption to be
terminated if the state amends its garnishment laws so that they no longer comply or if the
terms or conditions of the exemption have been violated. Id. § 870.56.
164. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1675 (West Supp. 1979); S. MORGANSTERN, supra note 117, at 41; Note,
Federal Restrictions of Wage Garnishment, supra note 93, at 287-88.
165. 1 LAB. L. REP., Wages Hours (CCH) 1 22,501.30 (1979).
166. The following states have had applications for exemption rejected by the Secretary
of Labor: Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, and Utah; reasons for denial of the exempt status have varied
with the particular provisions found in individual states' statutes. See 1 LAB. L. REP., Wages
Hours (CCH) 1 22,501.301 (1975). For example, Ohio, the first state to apply for exemption,
had a statute providing for only one garnishment per month and limiting the garnishment
to 17.5% of monthly earnings after deductions required by law. See Hodgson v. Cleveland
Mun. Court, 326 F Supp. 419, 427 (N.D. Ohio 1971). Although counsel for the state argued
that the provision was intended to be read in a manner consistent with the CCPA, the
Secretary found that application of the state's exemption formula could result in the gar-
nishment of 70% of an individual's weekly earnings and thus was not "substantially similar"
to the federal restrictions. See id. at 425. See generally Hodgson v. Hamilton Mun. Court,
349 F Supp. 1125 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
167. VA. CODE §§ 8.01-511 to 525 (Repl. Vol. 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
168. Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 425.501 to .526 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
169. 1 LAB. L. REP., Wages Hours (CCH) 22,501.301 (1975). Virginia's application for
exemption was accepted subject to two conditions: (1) whenever garnishments ordered
within the state are deemed to be governed by the laws of another state, and those laws are
applied, the restrictions of § 1673 still will be applied; (2) whenever the earnings of an indi-
vidual subject to garnishment are withheld and a suspending or supersedeas bond is under-
taken in the course of an appeal from a lower court decision, § 1963 will apply to the with-
holding of such earnings under this procedure. 29 C.F.R, § 870.57(b)(1), (2) (1979).
170. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1673 (West 1974 & Supp. 1979); VA. CODE: § 34-29 (Cum. Supp.
1979).
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made by the Tax Reduction Act.171 Because no Virginia cases that
construe the definitions of "garnishment," "earnings," and "dis-
posable earnings," are available the judicial and administrative in-
terpretations of these terms 1 are crucial to an understanding of
the scope and operation of Virginia's garnishment statute.
The Virginia statutory restrictions on wage garnishment apply
automatically in all cases, unless they have been specifically disal-
lowed by the court.173 The blanket exemption created cannot be
considered a mere personal privilege of the debtor because he can-
not waive it.174 To reinforce this concept, the Virginia statute pro-
vides that an assignment, sale, transfer, pledge, or mortgage of
wages or salary made by an individual is void and unenforceable
by any process of law to the extent of the statutory exemption.17 5
Additional Exemptins
The laws of Virginia offer further debtor protection when the
debtor is a householder or head of a family 176 The homestead ex-
emption provision entitles such a debtor to exempt from any pro-
cess of execution, including garnishment, his real or personal prop-
erty, including money and debts due to him, having an aggregate
value of not more than $5,000.' 7 This general homestead exemp-
171. See notes 136-40 supra & accompanying text.
172. See notes 107-34 supra & accompanying text.
173. The application of restrictions without exception in Virginia unless specifically disal-
lowed by the court, see VA. CODE §§ 8.01-516, -517 (Repl. Vol. 1977), is an improvement over
the federal scheme which provides that the general restrictions are automatically inapplica-
ble if the garnishment is to satisfy a judgment by a bankruptcy court, for delinquent taxes,
or for child support and alimony obligations. See notes 136-39 supra & accompanying text.
The Virginia employer is authorized to rely on the information contained in the employee's
withholding exemption certificate filed for federal income tax purposes in determining to
-which exemption he is entitled. VA. CODE § 8.01-515 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
174. VA. CODE §§ 34-22, -29 (Repl. Vol. 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
175. Id. § 34-29(e) (Cum. Supp. 1979). Thus, by statute, Virginia has resolved the ques-
tion that remains with respect to the effect of the federal restrictions of Title III on wage
assignments, which are by nature private contractual agreements. See note 115 supra &
accompanying text.
176. The term "householder" means any married or unmarried person who maintains a
separate residence, regardless of whether others are living with him. VA. CODE § 34-1 (Cum.
Supp. 1979). The term "head of a family" means one who occupies a relationship to persons
living with him, entitling them to a legal or moral right to support from him. Oppenheim v.
Myers, 99 Va. 582, 586, 39 S.E. 218, 219 (1901).
177. VA. CODE § 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1979). An additional exemption of $2000 is provided
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tion is available in addition to the specific restrictions on wage gar-
nishment contained in section 34-29.178 Because the determination
of what property shall be exempted is wholly within the discretion
of the householder, 19 the extent of exempted property that other-
wise would be subject to the garnishment process cannot be deter-
mined m advance. Theoretically, the householder could apply the
entire homestead exemption to a bank account °80 consisting of
$5,000 or to a debt due from another for that amount and thereby
deprive his creditor of that source of funds to satisfy his judgment.
At common law,""' and in Virginia prior to 1898,182 the wages
and salaries of all state employees and the employees of all politi-
cal subdivisions of the state were exempt from garnishment. The
basis of this broad governmental immunity was the public policy of
securing efficiency in the public service of such employees.18 Pub-
lic policy on this issue since has changed,18 4 and it is now expressly
provided by statute that the wages and salaries of all state employ-
ees,1 8 and those of all city, town, and county employees,188 are
subject to garnishment following any judgment rendered against
them. This general waiver of sovereign immunity is subject to a
single exception: when a state officer holds his office by virtue of
the Virginia Constitution 8 7 the common law rule is applied and his
for veterans having a service-connected disability. Id. § 34-4.1. For a survey of the historical
background and interpretations of the homestead provision, see M. BURKS, supra note 65, at
§8 439-54. See also Note, The Failure of the Virginia Exemption Plan, infra this issue.
178. VA. CODE § 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
179. See id., Linkenhoker's Heirs v. Detrick, 81 Va. 44, 52-53 (1885).
180. See Wilson v. Virginia Nat'l Bank, 214 Va. 14, 196 S.E.2d 920 (1973) (per curiam)
(holding that a homestead deed may be filed to exempt a bank account from garnishment).
181. See Annot., 56 A.L.R. 601 (1928).
182. See, e.g., Blair v. Marye, 80 Va. 485 (1885); Rolo v. Andes Ins. Co., 64 Va. (23
Gratt.) 509 (1873).
183. Hilton v. Amburgey, 198 Va. 727, 730, 96 S.E.2d 151, 153 (1957); Knight v. Peoples
Nat'l Bank, 182 Va. 380, 388, 29 S.E.2d 364, 368 (1944); Blair v. Marye, 80 Va. 485, 487
(1885).
184. See Boyd, Higgins & Goforth, Inc. v. Mahone, 142 Va. 690, 695-96, 128 S.E. 259, 261-
62 (1925) (noting that the duty and public policy of the state, as expressed in decisions of
the supreme court and statutory law, is to provide appropriate remedies for creditors to
satisfy their judgments). See also Portsmouth Gas Co. v. Sanford, 97 Va. 124, 127, 33 S.E.
516, 517 (1899).
185. VA. CODE § 8.01-522 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
186. Id. § 8.01-524.
187. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 4 provides as follows:
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compensation is exempt from garnishment. 88 Thus, sheriffs,189
treasurers, 90 commonwealth attorneys,' 9 ' and commissioners of
revenue' 92 who do not hold their offices by virtue of the General
Assembly or by virtue of the authority of a municipality or county
are not subject to garnishment for their debts lawfully incurred.
Finally, it is provided by statute that the wages of a minor are not
subject to garnishment to pay the debts of his parents. 9 3
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT
Although wages or other personal earnings usually are consid-
ered the principal object sought by a process of garnishment, a
wide range of property may be taken by such proceedings. Bank
accounts, debts, or accounts receivable due to the debtor, equitable
interests in trusts, and other funds held for the debtor's benefit all
are available to the creditor in satisfaction of his judgment.'
Thus, any person, corporation, or organization that is indebted to
the judgment debtor or in possession of property belonging to him
may be summoned as a garnishee in the garnishment
proceedings. 195
In Virginia, the garnishment process reaches not only an indebt-
edness presently existing, but also such debts or other obligations
coming into existence between the date of issuance of the sum-
mons and its return date.196 The summons must be returned
There shall be elected by the qualified voters of each county and city a trea-
surer, a sheriff, an attorney for the Commonwealth, a clerk, who shall be clerk
of the court in the office of which deeds are recorded, and a commissioner of
revenue. The duties and compensation of such officers shall be prescribed by
general law or special act.
Id.
188. Hilton v. Amburgey, 198 Va. 727, 729-31, 96 S.E.2d 151, 153 (1957).
189. Id.
190. See notes 187-88 supra & accompanying text.
191. See Burnett v. Brown, 194 Va. 103, 105, 72 S.E.2d 394, 395 (1952); notes 187-88
supra & accompanying text.
192. See McGinnis v. Nelson County, 146 Va. 170, 172, 135 S.E. 696, 697 (1926); notes
187-88 supra & accompanying text.
193. VA. CODE § 34-33 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
194. See notes 205-79 infra & accompanying text.
195. See notes 3-5 supra & accompanying text.
196. VA. CODE § 8.01-478, -501 (Repl. Vol. 1977); see Hicks v. Roanoke Brick Co., 94 Va.
741, 27 S.E. 596 (1897).
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within ninety days to the court from which it is issued, whether it
is a general district court or a circuit court.197 The creditor's lien
on a debtor's intangible personal property may be defeated by a
assignee for valuable consideriation and without notice.'98 By nega-
tive implication, a reasonable assumption is that when the transfer
is made without such consideration' or with the assignee's knowl-
edge of the fraud, the statutory provisions dealing with fraudulent
or voluntary conveyances 99 would be applicable and the transfer
would be void as to creditors. Courts in Virginia, however, have
held that the garnishment statutes do not contemplate or operate
on the estate in possession of the garnishee to which he has title.200
In Freitas v. Gnffith & Boyd,20 ' the court determined that per-
sonal property fraudulently transferred to a wife by her husband
could not be reached by a summons in garnishment on the wife
based on an execution against her husband.20 2 This decision is dif-
ficult to reconcile with Virginia cases dealing with fraudulent con-
veyances generally 203 and with those decisions in other jurisdic-
tions considering the effect of a fraudulent conveyance on the
availability of garnishment proceedings.20 4
197. VA. CODE § 8.01-514 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
198. See notes 49-50 supra & accompanying text.
199. VA. CODE §§ 55-80 to 82 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
200. See note 202 infra.
201. 112 Va. 343, 71 S.E. 531 (1911).
202. Id. at 345-46, 71 S.E. at 531-32. The court in Freitas sought to justify its holding by
labeling the garnishment process a "special procedure" and narrowly construing the statute
so that it no longer provides an appropriate remedy at law. Id. Concurrent jurisdiction over
alienations made to defraud creditors, however, long has been exercised by courts of law and
equity. See, e.g., Hoge v. Turner, 96 Va. 624, 32 S.E. 291 (1899); 1 R. BARTON, PLEADING AND
PRACTICE IN THE COURTS OF CHANCERY 587 (3d ed. 1926). Given the Virginia courts' wide
latitude of authority to determine liability in garnishment proceedings, the court in Freitas
should have treated the wife as an adverse claimant and adjudicated the validity of the
transfer. Freitas has been cited in only two other Virginia cases, as supplementary authority
for the proposition that a present fixed liability must exist before a judgment creditor can
maintain an action at law. See Lynch v. Johnson, 196 Va. 516, 520, 84 S.E.2d 419, 422
(1954); Combs v. Hunt, 140 Va. 627, 631, 125 S.E. 661, 662 (1924). See also Correspondence,
17 VA. L. REG. 645 (1911) (criticizing the Freitas decision).
203. See, e.g., McClintock v. Royall, 173 Va. 408, 4 S.E.2d 369 (1939) (by implication)
(holding that creditors may avoid conveyance at their instance); Davis v. Southern Distrib.
Co., 148 Va. 779, 139 S.E. 495 (1927) (stating that transactions between spouses will be
regarded with suspicion).
204. See, e.g., R.S. Carson Co. v. Hartman, 144 W. Va. 790, 111 S.E.2d 346 (1959); South-
ern Coop. Foundry Co. v. Warlick Furn. Co., 117 W. Va. 336, 185 S.E. 773 (1934). See gener-
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Wages or Salary
The wages or salary of a debtor have been described as a "spe-
cialized type of property, presenting distinct problems in our eco-
nomic system."20 5 Often a judgment creditor seeks to garnish an
individual's wages or salary because these periodic payments re-
present the debtor's only available material asset. The dangers in-
herent in permitting a creditor to divert the individual's wages or
salary from himself and his family are well documented. 20 6 As a
result, stringent restrictions on wage garnishment have been en-
acted at the state and federal levels to mitigate the harsh conse-
quences of the garnishment process.
The Virginia statute enumerates six categories, one of which
must be alleged to justify the issuance of the summons to garnish a
judgment debtor's wages or salary:
1. The summons is based upon a judgment upon which a prior
summons has been issued but not fully satisfied; or
2. No summons has been issued upon his suggestion against
the same judgment debtor within a period of eighteen months,
other than under the provisions of subdivision paragraph 1,
above; or
3. The summons is based upon a judgment granted against a
debtor upon a debt due or made for necessary food, rent or shel-
ter, public utilities including telephone service, drugs, or medical
care supplied the debtor by the judgment creditor or to one of
his lawful dependents, and that it is not for luxuries or nones-
sentials; or
4. The summons is based upon a judgment for a debt due the
judgment creditor to refinance a lawful loan made by an author-
ized lending institution; or
5. The summons is based upon a judgment on an obligation
incurred as an endorser or comaker upon a lawful note; or
6. The summons is based upon a judgment for a debt or debts
reaffirmed after bankruptcy.2 0 7
In operation, the statute prohibits a judgment creditor from is-
ally, 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 65-69, 73(a) (rev. ed.
1940); see also C. DRAKE, supra note 2, § 458.
205. Snladach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
206. See notes 99-110 supra & accompanying text.
207. VA. CODE § 8.01-511 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
[Vol. 21:793828
GARNISHMENT IN VIRGINIA
suing multiple summons against the same judgment debtor's wages
or salary within an eighteen-month period unless he falls within
one of the prescribed classifications. If a previous garnishment has
not been filed against the judgment debtor, there are no prerequi-
sites other than a valid, enforceable judgment, to the garnishment
of his wages or salary 20s
As a practical matter, the judgment creditor must ascertain the
amount of the judgment debtor's wages or salary and the periodic-
ity of payment. Knowledge of the precise payment dates will en-
able the judgment creditor to determine what issuing date of the
summons will result in reaching the maximum amount of the
debtor's nonexempt earnings available between that issuing date
and the return date.209 This information, as well as the employer's
correct name and address necessary for filing purposes, may be ob-
tained from the employer in the interrogatory proceeding. 10 In ad-
dition, the creditor should determine whether the debtor is a
"householder" or "head of a family" qualifying for the homestead
exemption,21' because this may bear on the amount of his wages or
salary actually subject to garnishment.212 When the judgment cred-
itor seeks to garnish the wages or salary of a state employee, the
summons must be served either on the officer or supervisor who is
head of the department, agency, or institution at which the debtor
is employed, or on any other officer through whom his salary is
paid;2" 3 the summons cannot be served on the State Treasurer or
State Comptroller, except as to employees of their respective de-
partments.214 A similar method of service would be followed when
the debtor is an officer or employee of a city, town, or county 21 5
208. Id. § 8.01-511(2).
209. Such knowledge is particularly important when an employee is paid on other than a
weekly basis. For example, when an employee receives his wages at two-week intervals, the
creditor will want the summons served on the garnishee no earlier than six days before pay
day to enable the creditor to reach the nonexempt portion of the following seven pay dates
within the 90 day period. Otherwise, he only could reach the available earnings on six pay
dates. See notes 196-97 supra & accompanying text.
210. See VA. CODE § 8.01-515 (Curi. Supp. 1979).
211. See notes 176-80 supra & accompanying text.
212. This determination would be relevant only if the employee claimed his wages or sal-
ary due as part of the $5000 allowable exemption. See note 177 supra & accompanying text.
213. VA. CODE § 8.01-522 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
214. Id.
215. See id. §§ 8.01-524, -525.
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Insurance Proceeds
As a general rule, the prospective proceeds of a life insurance
policy, even when the policy is fully paid, are not subject to gar-
nishment. 16 Payment of such proceeds is contingent on the death
of the insured and the insurance company therefore has no present
obligation to disburse the funds.2 1
Although the proceeds themselves cannot be garnished prior to
the death of the insured, authority in some jurisdictions suggests
that the cash surrender value, loan value, or accumulated divi-
dends of a life insurance policy may be reached during the in-
sured's lifetime.218 In Virginia, however, that a judgment creditor
cannot compel his debtor, through a garnishment proceeding, to
make the necessary election to receive these optional funds is rea-
sonably certain.219 The right to exercise such stipulations in the
insurance contract is generally considered to be personal to the in-
sured, or, more accurately, it cannot be exercised by persons other
216. See Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 268 (1954).
217. See White v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 150 Va. 849, 864, 143 S.E. 340, 344 (1928);
Boisseau v. Bass' Adm'r, 100 Va. 207, 213-15, 40 S.E. 647, 650 (1902).
218. In New York, for example, statutory provisions allow for garnishment of the cash
surrender value or loan value of an insurance policy, even if the conditions precedent to the
insured's exercise of such option are unfulfilled. See, eg., Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 105
N.Y.S.2d 24 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Silverman v. Levy, 75 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct. 1947), af'd per
curtam, 273 A.D. 952, 78 N.Y.S.2d 228, aff'd mem., 298 N.Y. 778, 83 N.E.2d 469 (1948).
219. See White v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 150 Va. 849, 864, 143 S.E. 340, 344 (1928);
Boisseau v. Bass' Adm'r, 100 Va. 207, 214-15, 40 S.E. 647, 650 (1902); Worthington, Exemp-
tion of the Debtor's Life Insurance in Virginia, 42 VA. L. REV. 239, 247 (1956). See Note,
The Failure of the Virginia Exemption Plan, tnfra this issue. The cash surrender value,
loan value or accumulated dividends seemingly can be reached by a creditor in satisfaction
of his judgment. The proper procedure by which this may be accomplished is through a
creditor's bill in equity. Worthington, supra, at 250. See E. MEADE, LILE's EQuiTy PLEADING
AND PRACTICE §§ 417-20 (3d ed. 1952). The Virginia Code specifically provides that, unless
the insured is a householder, a creditor of the insured may claim in full the cash surrender
value or loan value of any policy under which the insured has the power to change benefi-
ciaries. If the insured debtor is a householder, then the cash surrender values of policies up
to $10,000 are exempt. VA. CODE § 38.1-449 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
Furthermore, two decisions in the Fourth Circuit, both involving the satisfaction of tax
liens in favor of the federal government, have held that the government has a right to such
funds. This right cannot be defeated by the failure of the insured to elect the option. United
States v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1958); United States v. Ball, 207
F Supp. 835 (W.D. Va. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 326 F.2d 898 (4th Cir. 1964); see VA.
CODE §§ 55-142.1, 58-1014 (Repl. Vol. 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
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than those designated in the policy 220 Allowing the creditor to de-
mand the exercise of such options in effect would permit him to
change insured's contract or to make a new and different one in
order to subject it to the payment of his debt;221 ordinarily, the
creditor only can subject to his benefit an existing contract in favor
of the debtor. When an insured already has exercised the option on
the insurance contract and complied with all the valid conditions
entitling him to receive payment, such funds are subject to the
claims of the insured's creditors through garnishment. If the in-
sured has designated a beneficiary of the insurance proceeds, ab-
sent an intent to defraud creditors, the named beneficiary is enti-
tled upon the death of the insured to receive the proceeds free of
the claims of the insured's creditors.222
Insurance contracts designed to cover risks other than death,
such as liability or fire insurance, generally build no cash value and
are payable only upon the happening of the named contingency.
The obligation of the insurance company to distribute the proceeds
may become fixed and definite at that point and the company
could be summoned as garnishee prior to payment to the in-
sured.223 If liability insurance is involved, the obligation of the in-
surance company becomes fixed when it is reduced to a sum cer-
tain by recovery of a judgment against the insured.224 The terms of
the individual policy will control when liability actually attaches to
the company and what defenses, if any, are available in an action
to enforce compliance with its terms. 225 Any defenses available to
the company to negate its liability to the presumably insured could
be asserted against his judgment creditor in a garnishment
proceeding.
220. Scruggs v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 125 W. Va. 89, 94, 23 S.E.2d 74, 76
(1942); Farmers' & M. Bank v. National Life Ins. Co., 161 Ga. 793, 797, 131 S.E. 902, 903
(1926). See generally Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 268 (1954).
221. Boisseau v. Bass' Adm'r, 100 Va. 207, 214, 40 S.E. 647, 650 (1902).
222. VA. CODE § 38.1-448 (RepL. Vol. 1976).
223. The Virginia Code provides that payment to an insured in accordance with the terms
of the policy will discharge all liability, unless the company receives written notice from a
creditor prior to payment. Id. § 38.1-450.
224. See Union Indem. Co. v. Small, 154 Va. 458, 463, 163 S.E. 685, 687 (1930); Indemnity
Ins. Co. v. Davis' Adm'r, 150 Va. 778, 784-85, 143 S.E. 328, 329 (1928).
225. Compare Fentress v. Rutledge, 140 Va. 685, 125 S.E. 668 (1924) with Combs v. Hunt,
140 Va. 627, 125 S.E. 661 (1924).
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The Virginia Code designates specific instances when payments
made by an insurance company to an insured will be exempt from
the claims of the insured's creditors.226 Accident or sickness bene-
fits paid in weekly or monthly installments to the holder of any
policy covering such situations may be paid to the recipient free
from garnishment or other legal process. 227 Similarly, disability
benefits accruing to the insured under a life insurance policy are
exempt from the claims of his creditors.228 Finally, the proceeds of
a group life insurance policy, which might be instituted or main-
tained by a private employer for the benefit of his employees, are
not subject to garnishment or other legal process. 2 29 Presumably,
this exemption extends to retirement or pension proceeds or annu-
ity payments made under such a policy, as well as to funds re-
ceived by a beneficiary after the death of the insured.23 0
Bank Accounts
A general deposit of money in a financial institution may provide
the judgment creditor with a fertile source of funds to garnish. The
relationship between a bank and its depositor is that of debtor and
creditor; title to the money is vested in the bank and the depositor
has the right to claim an amount equivalent to the deposit.231
Through the garnishment process, 232 the judgment creditor accedes
226. VA. CODE §§ 38.1-346, -448 to 451, -482, -488 (Repl. Vol. 1976). See generally Fars,
Exemption of Insurance and Other Property in the Virgintas and Carolinas, 17 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 19 (1960); Worthington, supra note 219.
227. VA. CODE § 38.1-346 (Repl. Vol. 1976). The legislative intent of this section is to
protect the policyholder overcome by accident or sickness who is entitled to benefit pay-,
ments, so as fo prevent him and his family from turning to public charity for support. At-
lantic Life Ins. Co. v. Ring, 167 Va. 121, 126, 187 S.E. 449, 451 (1936).
228. VA. CODE § 38.1-488 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
229. VA. CODE § 38.1-482 (Repl. Vol. 1976); see Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson,
385 F Supp. 852 (E.D. Va. 1974); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Sykes, 106 F Supp.
116 (E.D. Va. 1952).
230. The word "proceeds," when used in insurance exemption statutes, comprehends the
protection values built up and payable during the life of the insured as well as death bene-
fits. In re White, 185 F Supp. 609 (N.D. W Va. 1960); see Comment, Bankruptcy-Life
Insurance-Trustee Not Entitled to Cash Surrender Value of Policy, 63 W VA. L. REV.
162 (1961).
231. W.L. Chase & Co. v. Norfolk Nat'l Bank, 151 Va. 1040, 1050, 145 S.E. 725, 728
(1928); Miller v. Norton, 114 Va. 609, 612-13, 77 S.E. 452, 453 (1913); see VA. CODE §§ 8.4-
201(1), - 213(3) (Added Vol. 1965).
232. As a practical matter, the garnishment summons must be served on the branch or
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to all the rights that the judgment debtor has in the bank account.
If the debtor's authority to withdraw from the account is qualified
the creditor's ability to reach the funds likewise will be limited.
The portion of an employee's wages or salary exempted by the
restrictions on wage garnishment loses its exempt status when de-
posited in a financial institution.233 Thus, a debtor cannot protect
his earnings from unlimited garnishment once title has passed to
the bank and the money is commingled with its general assets. The
Virginia Supreme Court, however, has held that the head of a fam-
ly may claim funds in a bank account as part of his homestead
exemption and deprive the judgment creditor of these funds to the
extent of the statutory limitations.3 4
If the judgment debtor holds title to a bank account jointly with
one or more persons, the modern trend is to allow the judgment
creditor to garnish the account only to the extent 3" of the debtor's
actual ownership of the funds in that account. The Virginia statute
relating to multiple-party accounts has been amended recently to
reflect this trend; effective July 1, 1980, the statute provides, "A
joint account belongs, during the lifetime of all parties, to the par-
ties in proportion to the net contributions by each to the sums on
deposit, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a contrary
intent. 23 8 The statute assumes that a person who deposits funds
in a joint account usually does not intend to make an irrevocable
gift of all or any part of the funds deposited; rather, he intends no
the man office supposedly holding the funds for the debtor because the other branches are
not concerned with accounts maintained at other locations. See Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 1088
(1967).
233. See note 119 supra & accompanying text. Contra, Williams v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 107 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Rutter v. Shumway, 16 Colo. 95, 26 P 321
(1891); Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Morris, 25 Tenn. App. 272, 156 S.W.2d 350 (1941).
234. Wilson v. Virginia Nat'l Bank, 214 Va. 14, 196 S.E.2d 920 (1973) (per curiam).
235. Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 1465, 1473 (1967).
236. VA. CODE § 6.1-125.3 (Repl. Vol. 1979). The language of this section, and that of the
other sections comprising the new legislation, is drawn verbatim from Article VI of the Uni-
form Probate Code. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 6-103(a). The principal purpose of Arti-
cle VI, which deals with nonprobate transfers generally, is to establish uniformity of state
law with respect to joint and survivorship accounts, Totten trust accounts and accounts
providing straight death benefits through "pay on death" provisions. See td. § 6-101, Com-
ment. See generally Johnson, Joint, Totten Trust and P.O.D. Bank Accounts: Virginia Law
Compared to the Uniform Probate Code, 8 U. RICH. L. REV. 41 (1973) (advocating the adop-
tion of the uniform legislation).
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change in beneficial ownership. 37 The rights of the parties and the
extent of the vulnerability of the account therefore must be deter-
mined by examining extrinsic evidence as to the respective contri-
butions of each depositor." ' To the extent that such contributions
cannot be proved, a court in all probability would divide the ac-
count equally among the parties.239
If the judgment debtor dies before the creditor has obtained sat-
isfaction of his judgment, the creditor is nevertheless protected. If
the probate assets are insufficient to pay the creditor's claim, the
creditor may make a written demand on the personal representa-
tive to proceed against a surviving party to the joint account to
recover amounts necessary to discharge the claim. The amount re-
covered by the personal representative may not exceed the amount
the deceased debtor owned immediately before death.40
Partnership Assets
The laws governing the rights and obligations of partners within
a general partnership and the preferences among creditors of the
partnership and of the individual partners have been codified in
the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), which was adopted by Vir-
ginia in 1918.41 With the adoption of the UPA, a new form of co-
ownership was created, that of the tenancy in partnership.242 An
individual partner owns no ascertainable portion of the specific
partnership assets until all the debts of the partnership, including
those due the other partners, are paid;243 his interest in the assets
237. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 6-103(a) & Comment. The presumption when the joint
owners are not married to each other that the account is for convenience only has its origins
in the common law. See Quesenberry v. Funk, 203 Va. 619, 622, 125 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1962);
King v. Merryman, 196 Va. 844, 856, 86 S.E.2d 141, 147 (1962); VA. CODE § 6.1-125.16 (Repl.
Vol. 1979). See generally Wilkinson v. Witherspoon, 206 Va. 297, 142 S.E.2d 478 (1965).
238. See Hayden v. Gardner, 238 Ark. 351, 381 S.W.2d 752 (1964).
239. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 6-103(a) & Comment; see Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 971(1972),
11 A.L.R.3d 1465, 1477 (1967).
240. VA. CODE § 6.1-125.8 (Repl. Vol. 1979); see 2 R. WELLMAN, UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
PRACTICE MANUAL 564-74 (2d ed. 1977); notes 260-66 infra & accompanying text.
241. VA. CODE §§ 50-1 to 43 (Repl. Vol. 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
242. Id. § 50-25(1) (Repl. Vol. 1974). See generally 1 R. ROWLEY, ROWLEY ON PARTNERSHIP
§§ 25.0 to-25.2 (2d ed. 1960).
243. Savings & Loan Corp. v. Bear, 155 Va. 312, 331, 154 S.E. 587, 593-94 (1930); Mad-
dock's Adm'r v. Skinker, 93 Va. 479, 484-85, 25 S.E. 535, 537 (1896); Christian v. Ellis, 42
Va. (1 Gratt.) 396, 402 (1845).
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is merely his share of the profits and surplus after payment of all
such debts.244 Accordingly, the judgment creditor of an individual
partner cannot subject a specific portion of any partnership asset
to execution24 5 or garnish a debt owing from a third person to the
partnership 246 to satisfy a judgment against that partner.
The legal effect of a general partnership is to segregate certain
assets contributed by the individual partners into a common fund
out of which the partnership debts are paid.24 7 When a judgment is
secured against the partnership, however, the lien created fixes on
all partnership assets and on the individual assets of each part-
ner. 24 8 Therefore, if the partnership assets are insufficient to meet
its liabilities, the partnership creditors may look to the separate
property of any one of the partners for payment.2 49 The creditor's
lien on the separate estate of a partner will have priority over the
liens of judgments subsequently rendered on individual obligations
of the partner.250 An individual partner thus may find debts or
property owing to him from a third person being garnished at the
244. VA. CODE § 50-26 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
245. Id. § 50-25(2)(c). The Code provides that a judgment creditor of an individual part-
ner may petition a competent court for a charging order directed against the debtor part-
ner's interest in the partnership; thereafter, the court may appoint a receiver to collect the
partner's share of the profits or other monies due to him. This procedure provides an exclu-
sive remedy. Id. § 50-28(1); see 1 R. RowLEY, supra note 242, § 28.1.
246. See Lacy v. Greenlee, 75 W Va. 517, 84 S.E. 921 (1915); Grogan v. Egbert, 44 W Va.
75, 79, 28 S.E. 714, 715 (1897).
247. Pettyjohn's Ex'rs v. Woodruffs Ex'r, 86 Va. 478, 479, 10 S.E. 715, 715 (1890); see VA.
CODE § 50-8(1) (Repl. Vol. 1974); J. CRANE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP AND
OTHER UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS § 837 (2d ed. 1952); 1 R. RowLEY, supra note 242, 8
6.1.
248. Savings & Loan Corp. v. Bear, 155 Va. 312, 329-30, 154 S.E. 587, 593 (1930). When a
judgment is rendered against the partnership, the partners are in the position of joint obli-
gors and a judgment creditor may proceed against them jointly or severally to satisfy his
judgment. See Ashby's Adm'r v. Porter, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 455, 465 (1875); VA. CODE § 50-15
(Repl. Vol. 1974). Yet each partner retains the right to demand exhaustion of the partner-
ship assets before he is subjected to personal liability. Id. § 50-38.
249. See VA. CODE §§ 50-18(a), -40(d) (RepL. Vol. 1974); note 248 supra.
250. Savings & Loan Corp. v. Bear, 155 Va. 312, 330 154 S.E. 587, 593 (1930); Straus v.
Kerngood, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 584, 588 (1871). The general rule, codified in the U.P.A. and
adopted in Virginia, VA. CODE § 50-40(h) (Repl. Vol. 1974), is that partnership creditors are
entitled to a preference over the creditors of individual partners in the administration of
partnership assets, who in turn are entitled to preference in the adminstration of the sepa-
rate estate. In Virginia, however, this general rule will not be construed so as to disturb a
partnership creditor's lien on a partner's separate estate. Savings & Loan Corp. v. Bear, 155
Va. at 330, 154 S.E. at 593.
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instance of partnership creditors to satisfy their judgments ren-
dered against the partnership.
Equitable Interests
The beneficiary in a trust arrangement is the equitable owner of
the property held in trust for his benefit and has the right to com-
pel performance of the trust in accordance with the terms of the
trust instrument.251 In Virginia, the equitable interests of a benefi-
ciary may be subjected to legal process, including garnishment, to
satisfy debts incurred by him.252 As a precondition to invoking the
garnishment remedy, however, the beneficiary must possess an ab-
solute right to receive the funds alloted to him by the trust mstru-
ment, for the judgment creditor can reach no more than the bene-
ficiary himself is entitled to.253 If the beneficiary's interests are
indefinite or rest upon some contingency, as when a trustee is
vested with discretionary powers to administer the trust funds,
they are not subject to garnishment, though the proper remedy
may be found in a court of equity 2 54 Likewise, when the benefi-
ciary is granted an income interest from the property held m trust,
his judgment creditor may not reach the corpus of the trust estate
through the garnishment process. 255
By statute, spendthrift trusts are recognized in Virginia as a
251. 2 A ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 130 (3d ed. 1967). Although equitable title is held
by the beneficiary, legal title is vested in a trustee who is charged with the duty of adminis-
tering the trust in good faith and in accordance with its express terms. Because the trustee
holds the funds in a fiduciary capacity, he is limited severely in what actions he may take
with respect to the trust property; as such, a judgment creditor of the trustee would be
unable to garnish the funds in his hands to satisfy his judgment. See 2 G. BOGERT, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 146 (rev. 2d ed. 1979).
When a person deposits money in a savings account in his own name in trust for another,
termed a tentative or Totten trust, and retains full control over the trust, including the
power of revocation, the creditors of the trustee have the right to reach the funds on de-
posit. Prestige Vacations, Inc. v. Kozak, 471 F Supp. 410 (N.D. Ohio 1979); 4 A. Scorr,
supra, § 330.12.
252. See VA. CODE § 55-19 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
253. See A. ScoTT, supra note 251, §§ 153-57, 160-61.
254. Courts of equity have inherent jurisdiction over the control and administration of
trusts. Therefore, when a trust is uncertain or indefinite in some respect and no adequate
remedy as such exists at law, the funds may be reached in a court of equity. See Coutts v.
Walker, 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 268, 275-76 (1830); 2 A. ScoTT, supra note 251, § 162.
255. 2 A. ScoTr, supra note 251, § 147.2.
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valid means of providing for the maintenance and support of a
beneficiary 256 The Virginia Code provides that an estate, not ex-
ceeding $200,000, may be created that is neither subject to aliena-
tion by the beneficiary nor liable for his debts lawfully mcurred. 57
The garnishment process thus is ineffective to reach funds held in
such an arrangement. 258 This is true even when the amount is far
in excess of what is reasonably necessary or proper for the benefi-
ciary's maintenance or support.25e
Decedent's Estates
The Virginia Code authorizes garnishment of the personal repre-
sentative of a decedent when the judgment debtor stands in the
position of beneficiary or creditor of the decedent's estate.2 0 The
garnishment process cannot be effective to reach such funds, how-
ever, until the fiduciary has determined finally what portion of the
estate is owed to the judgment debtor;21 before this determina-
tion, the personal representative of a decedent is deemed to be an
officer of the court holding the funds tn custodia legs.2612 The
courts are directed by statute to suspend the garnishment proceed-
ings until the amounts owed can be ascertained definitely.2e3
If the judgment debtor has died, his estate remains liable on his
just obligations incurred during his lifetime.2 " The creditor's ex-
clusive remedy under these circumstances is to file a bill in the
256. Alderman v. Virgina Trust Co., 181 Va. 497, 512, 25 S.E.2d 333, 340 (1943); see
Dunlop v. Dunlop's Ex'r, 144 Va. 297, 309, 132 S.E. 351, 354 (1926).
257. VA. CODE § 55-19 (Repl. Vol. 1974). Compare RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
156(2) (1959).
258. See UMW v. Boyle, 418 F Supp. 406 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 567 F.2d 112
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 956 (1978) (holding that a valid and enforceable
spendthrift trust is not subject to garnishment or other legal process). On public policy
grounds, however, certain narrowly delineated classes of creditors have been excepted from
application of the spendthrift doctrine and permitted to reach the beneficiary's interest in
the trust. 2 A. Sco'rr, supra 251, § 157; RESTATE ENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 157 (1959);
Annot., 174 A.L.R. 310 (1948).
259. Rountree v. Lasse, 155 F.2d 471, 474-75 (4th Cir. 1946).
260. VA. CODE § 8.01-511 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
261. Id. § 8.01-518 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
262. See Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 1301, 1310-11 (1974).
263. VA. CODE § 8.01-518 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
264. See Brown v. Hargraves, 198 Va. 748, 750, 96 S.E.2d 788, 790 (1957); Trevillian's
Ex'rs v. Guerrant's Ex'rs, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 525, 529 (1879).
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nature of a creditor's bill for settlement of the estate and ascer-
tainment and security of his interest.265 Administration of a dece-
dent's estate is a function reserved for the probate courts; as such,
garnishment proceedings would constitute an impermissible inter-
ference with its jurisdiction and processes . 66
ERISA Benefits
As a general rule, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA)26  prohibits the assignment or alienation of em-
ployee pension benefits received under qualified pension plans.
ERISA's anti-assignment or alienation provisions26 have been con-
strued by the Treasury Department to preclude garnishment or at-
tachment of such benefits by creditors. 2 9 There is authority, how-
ever, for the existence of an implied exception to these provisions
for the limited purpose of satisfying spousal and child support ob-
ligations issued by a competent state court.27 0 The rationale for
this exception is that the anti-assignment or alienation provisions
are intended only to protect an employee from the claims of busi-
ness creditors,271 ensuring his ability to meet his family obligations
265. See 2 T. HARRISON, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION §§ 538-42 (2d ed. 1961). See gener-
ally 2 J. LOMAx, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ExECUTORs AND ADMINISTRATORS 642-49 (2d ed.
Richmond 1857).
266. See Bickle v. Christman's Adm'x, 76 Va. 678, 692 (1882); Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 1301,
1308-10 (1974). Another reason for disallowing garnishment of the judgment debtor's per-
sonal representative is he "stands in the shoes" of his decedent, rather than being a third
person holding property of the debtor as is contemplated by the garnishment statute. An-
not., supra, at 1304.
267. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1975); I.R.C. §§ 401-04.
268. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13).
269. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(ii) (1976). Compare Cody v. Riecker, 454 F Supp. 22
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), afl'd, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979) (accord) with National Bank of N.
America v. International Bd. of Elec. Workers Local 3, 93 Misc. 2d 590, 400 N.Y.S.2d 482
(Sup. Ct. 1977) (contra).
270. Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592
F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979); Seneco of Florida, Inc. v. Clark, 473 F Supp. 902 (M.D. Fla. 1979);
Cartlege v. Miller, 457 F Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Stone v. Stone, 450 F Supp. 919
(N.D. Cal. 1978). Contra, General Motors Corp. v. Townsend, 468 F Supp. 466 (E.D. Mich.
1976).
271. Seneco of Florida v. Clark, 473 F Supp. at 907; Stone v. Stone, 450 F Supp. at 926.
The support claims of an ex-spouse are distinguishable from claims of business creditors in
that "Congress intended that ERISA protect employees and their families who will depend
upon the benefits for security, but intended no such protection for business creditors."
Seneco v. Clark, 473 F Supp. at 907 (emphasis supplied).
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after retirement. To interpret the provisions to allow an employee
to insulate himself from valid support claims would frustrate,
rather than further, the policies underlying these provisions.272
Other Property or Interests
Courts uniformly have held that funds in the custody of a court
pending determination of entitlement are not subject to garnish-
ment.2 73 Once the proceedings have been concluded and a final de-
termination of the party entitled to the money and the extent of
that entitlement has been made, the court officer generally is re-
garded as the agent of such party and the funds m his custody
therefore are subject to garnishment.2 74 Although an attorney is
considered an officer of the court in many instances, the general
rule with respect to a client's funds in his possession is that he
holds such funds as an agent of the client and that the funds are
not immune from garnishment. 5
Because of the unique rules governing commercial paper, the
holder in due course of a negotiable instrument is generally exempt
from the claims of all other persons to the instrument.27 e Accord-
ingly, the maker of a negotiable note cannot be garnished by the
judgment creditor of the payee before the maturity of the note.2 77
Shares of corporate stock cannot be reached by garnishment
proceedings. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the instrument
272. Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F Supp. at 1156; Stone v. Stone, 450 F Supp. at 926. A
congressional policy of noninterference with state enforcement of family support obligations
may be inferred from judicial interpretation of exemption provisions in other federal stat-
utes. See Wissner v. Wissner, 378 U.S. 655 (1950) (National Service Life Insurance Act);
Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904) (Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
273. See, e.g., Saunders v. Adcock, 249 Ark. 856, 462 S.W.2d 219 (1971); Leatherman v.
Gimouginas, 192 So. 2d 301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 936, 939-41
(1965). But see VA. CODE § 8.01-558 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (providing that when an officer of the
court has money or effects of the defendant held under an executed attachment or other
legal process, a delivery to such officer of an attachment will be deemed a levy on such
money or effects and constitute a hen from the time of delivery).
274. See, e.g., Hooten v. Conklin, 236 Ark. 911, 370 S.W.2d 607 (1963); Annot., supra note
266, at 939. Contra, Dale v. Brumbly, 98 Md. 468, 56 A. 807 (1904).
275. E.g., K-M Auto Supply, Inc. v. Reno, 236 A.2d 706, 706 (Del. Sup. 1967); Annot., 35
A.L.R.3d 1094, 1097 (1971).
276. See VA. CODE §§ 8.3-302, -305 (Added Vol. 1965).
277. See 2 R. BARTON, THE PRACTICE IN THE COURTS OF LAW IN CIVL CASES § 191 (2d ed.
1892).
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evidencing the corporation's liability to the shareholder is vital and
must actually be seized by an officer of the court before any execu-
tion process is valid against it. 278 Therefore, mere service of a gar-
nishment summons on a third person holding the judgment
debtor's stock certificates would be ineffective to secure them for
the creditor's satisfaction.
27 9
MOTION TO QUASH AND REMEDY FOR EXCESSIVE GARNISHMENT
A motion to quash the execution is the proper means by which a
judgment debtor may challenge the regularity and validity of the
creditor's underlying judgment and the writ of fien facias issuing
from that judgment.280 It is a direct proceeding attacking the judg-
ment and may be made at any time, even after the return day of
the garnishment summons. 21 The Virginia Code authorizes the
court, upon application by the judgment debtor and receipt of such
bond as the court may prescribe, to issue an order staying the gar-
nishment proceedings until the motion is heard and determined.2 2
If the court vacates or annuls the judgment, it is deemed void ab
int0 283 and no further executions may be commenced under it.
In addition, the Virginia courts have held that under certain lim-
ited circumstances the process of garnishment against a judgment
debtor may be set aside by equitable procedures.2  In Powell v.
Beneficwl Finance Co., 285 the court held that when knowledge of
278. VA. CODE § 8.8-317 (Added Vol. 1965).
279. See Frost v. Davis, 288 F.2d 497, 498 (5th Cir. 1961).
280. See Broyhill v. Dawson, 168 Va. 321, 324, 191 S.E. 779, 781 (1937); Sutton v. Marye,
81 Va. 329 (1886); Snavely v. Harkrader, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 487, 492 (1878); M. BuRKs, supra
note 65, § 377.
281. See Johnston v. Pearson, 121 Va. 453, 457-58, 93 S.E. 640, 641-42 (1917);
Lowenbach's Adm'r v. Kelley, 111 Va. 439, 441-43, 69 S.E. 352, 353-54 (1910).
282. VA. CODE § 8.01-477 (Repl. Vol. 1977). The statute makes clear that notice must be
given to the adverse party when making a motion to quash. See Snavely v. Harkder, 71 Va.
(30 Gratt.) 487, 492-93 (1878); Dillard v. Thornton, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 392, 398 (1877).
283. Riely v. Solenberger, 18 VA. L. REG. 352, 354 (Cir. Ct. Va. June, 1912).
284. A modern rule has evolved that strictly limits the availability of equitable relief from
a judgment otherwise valid on its face. Because of the tremendous increase in the frequency
of litigation, public policy requires that a high degree of finality be given to judgments ren-
dered, thereby promoting efficiency in the judicial system. A broad rule permitting other-
wise would diminish the effect of res judicata. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 126, Com-
ment a (1942).
285. 213 Va. 647, 194 S.E.2d 742 (1973). In Powell, one of the defendant's daughters exe-
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the proceedings resulting in a default judgment was withheld from
the defendant and the judgment was based on a forged instrument,
a court of equity was open to the injured party
When a judgment creditor makes illegitimate use of the garnish-
ment process to tie up more of the debtor's money or property
than is reasonably necessary to satisfy his claim, he cannot be
shielded from liability for such abuse by demonstrating the valid-
ity of his claim. 2 6 An action for excessive garnishment essentially
comprises the tort of abuse of process.2 7 The abuse of process ac-
tion presupposes an originally valid and regular process, duly and
properly issued, and relies primarily on abuses after it has been
sued out.288 In order to recover in such an action, the judgment
debtor must demonstrate not only that the garnishment was exces-
sive, but also that there was a willful and intentional abuse or mis-
use of the process to accomplish some wrongful objective beyond
that of satisfying the judgment.28 9
The damages available in an action for excessive garnishment
are to be assessed in accordance with the general rules of damages.
Hence, they must result naturally and proximately from the judg-
ment creditor's conduct and not be too speculative or remote.290
cuted a promissory note by forging her father's signature, and another daughter later re-
ceived substituted service of the garnishment summons on her father. The father had no
knowledge of the circumstances until the sums were deducted from his wages. Id. at 647-48,
194 S.E.2d at 743-44.
286. Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 493, 504-05 (1974) See generally Greenfield, Coercive Collection
Tactics-An Analysis of the Interests and the Remedies, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1972);
Hurt, Debt Collection Torts, 67 W VA. L. REv. 201 (1965).
287. See American Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Bel-Aire Interiors, Inc., 105 Ariz. 590, -, 469
P.2d 75, 76-77 (1970); Nevada Credit Rating Bureau, Inc. v. Williams, 88 Nev. 601, 503 P.2d
9, 12 (1972). The two fundamental elements of the tort of abuse of process are an ulterior
motive and a willful act m the use of the process not proper in the regular course of the
proceedings. Mullins v. Sanders, 189 Va. 624, 633, 54 S.E.2d 116, 121; W. PROSSER, HmD-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 121 (4th ed. 1971).
Abuse of process differs from the tort of malicious prosecution because in the former ac-
tion, the plaintiff need not allege and prove that the suit was instituted maliciously and
without probable cause. Mullins v. Sanders, 189 Va. at 633, 54 S.E.2d at 121; see W. PROS-
SER, supra, §§ 119, 121. Although the elementj of a malicious prosecution are probably lack-
ing in an excessive garnishment action, this action may lie when a judgment creditor has
caused a garnishment summons to issue on a judgment that has been satisfied. See Ailstock
v. Moore Lime Co., 104 Va. 565, 52 S.E. 213 (1905).
288. See Mullins v. Sanders, 189 Va. 624, 633-34, 54 S.E.2d 116, 121-22 (1949).
289. See Glidewell v. Murry-Lacy & Co., 124 Va. 563, 570-71, 98 S.E. 665, 668 (1919).
290. See 30 AM. JUR. 2d Executions §§ 763-769 (1967). See generally 5 A. CORBIN, CON-
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Under the proper circumstances, the judgment debtor may recover
damages for the diminished market value of the property seized e.
or compensation for deprivation of the value of the use of such
property 292 When it is apparent that the judgment creditor's mo-
tive was to oppress or harass the debtor, punitive or exemplary
damages also should be recoverable.293 If the debtor is unable to
prove acutal damages, nominal damages may be recoverable for the
wrongful invasion of his property rights.294
GARNISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR COLLECTION OF SUPPORT
OBLIGATIONS
The incidence of marital breakdown in the United States has
grown at an unparalleled rate. One of the more pernicious results
of this growth has been that an increasing number of families are
forced to seek public assistance because of recalcitrant spouses
who fail to carry out their legal support obligations. 95 In response
to this serious problem, Congress enacted the Social Services
Amendments of 1974,98 creating a network of federally assisted
and supervised state enforcement agencies to exact compliance
with domestic support decrees.
Before the enactment of these amendments, the rule firmly es-
tablished by judicial precedent was that public policy considera-
tions precluded a creditor from garnishing a debt due to his debtor
by the United States.297 This general rule, however, was subject to
one well-recognized exception. When Congress had established an
TRACTS §§ 990-1077 (1964).
291. See Rosenberg v. Stone, 160 Va. 381, 388, 168 S.E. 436, 438 (1933). See also Slaugh-
ter v. Denmead, 88 Va. 1019, 1021, 14 S.E. 833, 834 (1892).
292. See State v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 81 W Va. 749, 752-54, 95 S.E. 783,
785 (1918).
293. See Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. 905, 909-10, 114 S.E.2d 617, 621 (1960); Turk v. Mar-
tin, 124 Va. 103, 109-13, 97 S.E. 351, 353-54 (1918).
294. See News Leader Co. v. Kocen, 173 Va. 95, 107-08, 3 S.E.2d 385, 390-91 (1939);
Building, Light & Water Co. v. Fray, 96 Va. 559, 565-66, 32 S.E. 58, 60-61 (1899).
295. See note 139 supra & accompanying text.
296. Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 42 U.S.C.).
297. See Buchanan v. Alexander, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 20 (1846) (holding that to allow gar-
nishment of funds in the hands of a federal disbursing officer would defeat the purposes for
which such moneys were appropriated and interfere generally with the processes of public
administration). See also United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940); Applegate v. Apple-
gate, 39 F Supp. 887 (E.D. Va. 1941).
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independent agency with the power to engage in commercial and
business transactions and endowed it with the authority to "sue or
be sued," that agency was no less amenable to judicial process than
would be a private enterprise under like circumstances. 98 This
waiver of governmental immunity in the case of such autonomous
federal agencies was affirmed recently in two decision of the East-
ern District of Virginia which held the United States Postal Ser-
vice was subject to garnishment procedures to effect state court
judgments.299
Section 659 of the amendments is particularly significant be-
cause it authorizes the garnishment of all federal employees in-
cluding military personnel, whether active or retired, as a means of
collecting court-ordered alimony and child support payments. 00
The net effect of section 659 is to make the federal government
amenable to process as a garnishee in state court proceedings to
the same extent as a private individual. It represents a waiver of
sovereign immunity in one narrow class of actions involving the
298. FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940); see Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Menihan
Corp., 312 U.S. 81 (1941); Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381 (1939). This
trilogy of Supreme Court cases established the rule that a federal agency "launched into the
commercial world" is amenable to judicial process. But see De Paul Community Health
Center v. Campbell, 445 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (holding that the United States Vet-
erans Administration was not subject to garnishment). See generally Annot., 38 A.L.R. FED.
546 (1978).
299. Bank of Va. v. Tompkins, 434 F Supp. 787 (E.D. Va. 1977); United Va. BankfNat'l
v. Eaves, 416 F Supp. 518 (E.D. Va. 1976); accord, May Dep't Stores Co. v. Williamson, 549
F.2d 1147 (8th Cir. 1977); Standard Oil Div., Am. Oil Co. v. Starks, 528 F.2d 201 (7th Cir.
1975). Contra, Kann Corp. v. Monroe, 425 F Supp. 169 (D.D.C. 1977); Lawhorn v. Lawhorn,
351 F Supp. 1399 (S.D. W. Va. 1972). 39 U.S.C. §§ 201, 401(1) (1970), grants the Postal
Service wide and distinct powers, separate from the federal government, including the
power to sue or to be sued m its official name.
300. 42 U.S.C.A. § 659 (West Supp. 1979) provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, effective January 1, 1975,
moneys (the entitlement to which is based upon remuneration for employ-
ment) due from, or payable by, the United States or the District of Columbia
(including any agency, subdivision, or instrumentality thereof) to any mdivid-
ual, including members of the armed services, shall be subject, in like manner
and to the same extent as if the United States or the District of Columbia were
a private person, to legal process brought for the enforcement, against such
individual of his legal obligations to provide child support or make alimony
payments.
Id. See the discussion in Note, Enforcement of Family Support Obligations in Virginia,
infra this issue.
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enforcement of garnishment writs issued by state courts to satisfy
familial support obligations.30'
A broad range of funds ordinarily payable by the federal govern-
ment to its civil servants and military personnel are available for
garnishment under section 659. The definitional section accompa-
nying section 659 provides a detailed description of what monies
are deemed to be payments "based on remuneration for employ-
ment. 3 0 2 This general classification includes all compensation paid
for personal services rendered by an individual, regardless of how
the payments are denominated. In addition, all periodic benefits or
other payments to an individual are subject to garnishment, in-
cluding pensions, retirement pay, annuities, dependent's or survi-
vor's benefits, and similar amounts paid on account of personal
services performed by the individual or any other person.303
Judicial decisions construing the phrase "remuneration for em-
ployment" have further delineated its meaning. The district court
in Watson v. Watson""4 confronted whether the defendant's mili-
tary retirement pay was to be considered salary or a vested sum
earned by his prior service. The court determined that a retired
officer retains his status as an officer and earns the payments as
compensation for obeying military discipline and being subject to
recall to active military service, rather than receiving them as a
vested pension or annuity 3 0 5 The distinction is an important one
because it follows that the anticipated future retirement pay, like
the prospective earnings of an employee, are entirely speculative
and therefore, are not subject to garnishment; only when such pay-
ments remain accumulated and unpaid may they be reached.
Other courts have held that disability payments0 6 and federal in-
301. Overman v. United States, 563 F.2d 1287, 1291 (8th Cir. 1977).
302. 42 U.S.C.A. § 662(0 (West Supp. 1979).
303. Id. Certain types of benefits are specifically exempt from garnishment. Any pay-
ments made as compensation for death or the contraction of "black lung" disease are ex-
empt. Furthermore, any pensions or payments as compensation for a service-connected disa-
bility or death made by the Veterans' Administration are exempt.
304. 424 F Supp. 866 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
305. Id. at 868. The district court relied on two earlier cases for its interpretation, Hooper
v. Hartman, 163 F Supp. 437 (S.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd per curtam, 274 F.2d 429 (9th Cir.
1959), and Hostinsky v. United States, 292 F.2d 508 (Ct. Cl. 1961). See also Badeau v.
United States, 130 U.S. 439 (1889).
306. Elmwood v. Elmwood, 295 N.C. 168, 244 S.E.2d 668 (1978). The court stressed that
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come tax refunds3 0 7 are not "remuneration for employment" as
contemplated by section 659.
When support obligations are involved, section 659 operates to
subject the federal government to liability as a garnishee to the
same extent as a private person under the laws of the state in
which the garnishment proceedings are commencedsca The laws of
the forum state generally determine what steps are necessary to
obtain issuance of a valid alimony or child suppport order and its
enforcement through the garnishment process,30 but the federal
statutes are deemed controlling m certain limited aspects. For ex-
ample, with respect to section 659, federal rather than state law
controls the definition of "alimony" and "child support."3 10 The
federal statute specifically excludes from the definition of "ali-
mony" any division of property in the nature of property settle-
ment between former spouses. 11 The statute specifically includes
within the ambit of "alimony" and "child support" attorney's fees,
interest, and court costs to the extent that they are expressly re-
such disability benefits are more closely akin to benefits payable pursuant to the Workmen's
Compensation Act, for disability by accident arising out of and m the course of employment.
Id. at 179, 244 S.E.2d at 675.
307. Enfinger v. Enfinger, 452 F Supp. 553 (M.D. Ga. 1978). The court noted that the tax
refund payment did not arise out of any employment relationship between the debtor and
the federal government. Id. at 555.
308. See note 300 supra & accompanying text.
309. For a thorough exposition of Virginia statutory and case law pertaining to divorce,
alimony and child support, see A. PHELPS, DIVORCE AND ALIMONY IN VIRGINIA AND WEST
VIRGINIA (2d ed. 1963).
310. Murray v. Murray, 558 F.2d 1340, 1341-42 (8th Cir. 1977) (per cunam).
311. 42 U.S.C.A. § 662(c) (West Supp. 1979). The term "alimony" contemplates periodic
payments of funds for support and maintenance to the spouse. It does not include any pay-
ment or transfer of property or its value by an individual to his spouse or former spouse in
compliance with any community property settlement, equitable distribution of property, or
other division of property between them. Id., see Crawley v. Crawley, 358 So. 2d 456 (Ala.
Civ. App.) (award of "alimony in gross" not alimony under the statute), cert. denied, 358
So. 2d 458 (Ala. 1978); United States v. Stelter, 567 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1978) (claim to com-
munity property not alimony under the statute); Butler v. Butler, 219 Va. 164, 165, 247
S.E.2d 353, 354 (1978) (per curiam) (dismissing appeal from trial court holding that judg-
ment for arrearages for support and maintenance not alimony). Courts uniformly have held
that the United States is immune from suit except when specifically authorized by an act of
Congress, and then, only to the extent that the act clearly grants consent to specific types of
suits. See, e.g., Kelley v. Kelley, 425 F Supp. 181, 182 (W.D. La. 1977); United States v.
Stelter, 567 S.W.2d at 797. Statutes waiving sovereign immunity are to be construed strictly.
See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 141-43 (1972); United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1941).
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coverable in the state divorce decree. 1 2
The proper method of service of the garnishment summons on
the federal government is prescribed by the Virginia Code.3 13 The
federal statute, however, further clarifies this procedure by provid-
ng that service shall be accomplished by certified or registered
mail, return receipt requested, or by personal service on the appro-
priate agent designated for receipt.3 14 In addition, the summons
must contain sufficient data to permit prompt identification of the
judgment debtor and the money involved. 15
The federal and state statutory exemptions from garnishment
are fully applicable when determining what portion of the funds
owing from the federal government to the judgment debtor are ac-
tually available for garnishment.3 16 Because such funds generally
are denominated as "remuneration for employment," the percent-
age limitations on wage garnishment apply whether the individual
receives the money as compensation for current employment or as
a pension, annuity, or other benefit payment for past employ-
ment.3"The pertinent federal statute also provides that certain ad-
ditional deductions are to be made18 beyond those provided for
under the Virginia Code or the CPPA3s1 in calculating the amount
of the individual's disposable earnings. In addition to those
amounts "required by law to be withheld," any amounts paid by
the individual through salary deductions for health or life insur-
ance premiums or as normal retirement contributions are excluded
when determining his garnishable disposable earnings. 320 Those
who do not work for the federal government do not enjoy as exten-
sive wage protection.
312. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 662(b), (c) (West Supp. 1979). See Murray v. Murray, 558 F.2d 1340,
1341 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
313. See VA. CODE § 8.01-523 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
314. 42 U.S.C.A. § 659(b) (West Supp. 1979).
315. Id.
316. See notes 93-193 supra & accompanying text.
317. See Samples v. Samples, 414 F Supp. 773 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
318. 42 U.S.C.A. § 66 2 (g) (West Supp. 1979).
319. VA. CODE § 34-29(d)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979) and 15 U.S.C. § 1672(b) (1970) both pro-
vide that "disposable earnings" means that part of the earnings of any individual remaining
after the deduction of any amounts required by law to be withheld. See notes 121-27 supra
& accompanying text.
320. 42 U.S.C.A. § 662(g) (West Supp. 1979).
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The federal courts have limited jurisdiction and are empowered
to hear only those cases authorized by a jurisdictional grant from
Congress pursuant to article III of the United States Constitu-
tion.32 1 The federal courts thus far have rejected uniformly juris-
diction over ordinary garnishment proceedings under section 659,
whether the parties have sought removal of the action or the action
has been commenced initially in a federal court.3 2 2 The purpose
and effect of section 659 is to waive sovereign immunity in the lim-
ited circumstance when support obligations are involved. It neither
purports to, nor does it, create a statutory right to relief by way of
garnishment; it merely removes the government's immunity from
such proceedings to the extent authorized under state law.3 23 As
321. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §§ 7-8 (3d ed. 1976). The presumption is that a given
federal court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a particular suit. This presumption must be
overcome by a conclusive showing that the court in fact has jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Id. Before a party can bring suit in a federal court, he must allege and prove that,
absent a special jurisdictional grant, his cause of action falls within one of the following
statutory bases for jurisdiction: 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp. 1979) (federal question ju-
risdiction); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (West 1976 & Supp. 1979) (claims against the United States);
28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (West 1973 & Supp. 1979) (actions generally removable); 28 U.S.C. §
1442 (1970) (removal of suits against federal officers or agencies). Id. at § 69. Each basis has
been held unavailable to a person suing under § 659. See note 300 supra & accompanying
text.
322. See Diaz v. Diaz, 568 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1977); Overman v. United States, 563 F.2d
1287 (8th Cir. 1977); Wilhelm v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, Accouting and Fin.
Center, 418 F Supp. 162 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Popple v. United States, 416 F Supp. 1227
(W.D.N.Y. 1976); Golightly v Golightly, 410 F Supp. 861 (D. Neb. 1976); Morrison v. Morr-
son, 408 F Supp. 315 (N.D. Tex. 1976); West v. West, 402 F Supp. 1189 (N.D. Ga. 1975);
Bolling v. Howland, 398 F Supp. 1313 (M.D. Tenn. 1975). Contra, Williams v. Williams, 427
F Supp. 557 (D. Md. 1976).
Some of the litigants have sought to contest the validity off the underlying divorce decree.
These attempts have failed because of the well settled doctrine that domestic relations in-
volve questions of singular significance to the administration of state affairs that cannot be
resolved appropriately in a federal forum. Diaz v. Diaz, 568 F.2d 1061, 1062 (4th Cir. 1977);
see, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1859).
One court, in refusing jurisdiction, was prompted to write the following:
[This court] will not readily infer that Congress intended to permit federal
agencies to be dragged in as defendants by any federal employee or spouse of
an employee who, unhappy with a prior state adjudication, seeks to contest it
by suing the Government over wage garnishment rather than challenging the
divorce decree in an appropriate state forum. To have federal courts adjudicat-
ing such disputes, where the only federal connection is the garnishment of gov-
ernment wages, would truly be a case of the tail wagging the dog.
Overman v. United States, 563 F.2d 1287, 1292-93 (8th Cir. 1977).
323. Morrison v. Morrison, 408 F Supp. 315, 317 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
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such, section 659 does not provide an independent jurisdictional
basis on which an action can be maintained in the federal courts.
Section 660, however, does create original jurisdiction in the fed-
eral district courts to enforce certain support orders.32 4 Under this
section, consent and certification from the Secretary of Health, Ed-
ucation and Welfare are jurisdictional prerequisites to suing in the
federal courts.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing exposition is intended as a comprehensive survey
of current garnishment practice in Virginia as it has been affected
by existing federal legislation. To this end, little commentary as to
what the law could or should be has been presented. Nevertheless,
several inequitable aspects to the Virginia scheme exist, notably
with regard to garnishment of an employee's wages or salary Vir-
gmia provides the minimum acceptable standard mandated by fed-
eral statute for debtor protection in this area. In light of the often
devastating effects that wage garnishment can have on a debtor
and his family, further safeguards are warranted.
First, the class of allowable deductions to be made in arriving at
an employee's disposable earnings should be expanded to protect
certain other important basic expenses. In addition to those
amounts "required by law to be withheld," the definition should
include amounts deducted from the employee's paycheck for
health insurance, life insurance, normal retirement benefits, and
union dues. Because these expenses currently are included within
the classification of disposable earnings, the debtor, during a pe-
riod of financial difficulty, may be forced to cease making these
vital payments in order to provide daily necessities for himself and
his family
Second, the current Virginia law allows a stated percentage of
earnings to be subjected to garnishment and does not differentiate
324. 42 U.S.C. § 660 (Supp. V 1975) reads as follows:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction, without regard
to any amount m controversy, to hear and determine any civil action certified
by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare under section 652(a)(8) of
this title. A civil action under this section may be brought in any judicial dis-
trict m which the claim arose, the plaintiff resides, or the defendant resides.
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between a married person with children and a single person. The
exemption statute should be amended to provide a differential per-
centage scale that accords the head of a family an exemption of an
additional ten percent of his wages and makes the maximum gar-
nishable portion fifteen percent of his total earnings. This change
would not create any additional burden or expense on the em-
ployer, who is authorized by statute to rely on the information con-
tained in the employee's federal withholding exemption certificate
when determining the employee's exemption status.
Finally, the statutory requirement that a judgment creditor al-
lege one of six specific circumstances before a wage garnishment
summons will issue, though intended as supplementary protection
for the debtor, in practice provides little protection, if any, to most
debtors. Similarly, the special treatment of debts incurred in
purchasing necessary items such as food or shelter is difficult to
justify. The General Assembly apparently felt that those who ex-
tend credit for such basic needs are entitled to preference in their
attempts to recover payment. This belief is paradoxical because
the statute puts the low income family, which can afford only nec-
essary items, in a worse position than the family that buys nones-
sential or luxury items on credit.
Virginia should formulate a comprehensive consumer credit
code, incorporating the garnishment statutes within a broader
framework of legislation designed to achieve a more equitable bal-
ance between the competing interests of creditors and debtors. The
Uniform Consumer Credit Codes25 and versions adopted in various
325. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.C.] differs from the
C.C.P.A. m a few major respects. First, its limitations on garnishment are applicable only if
the garnishment summons is issued to enforce payments of a judgment arising out of a
consumer credit sale, consumer loan, or consumer lease. See U.C.C.C. § 5.102. Second, it,
provides that forty, rather than thirty, times the federal mmunum hourly wage per work-
week is exempt from garnishment. Id. § 5.105. Third, the U.C.C.C. prohibits employee dis-
charge resulting from garnishment without reference to the number of garnishments in-
volved. Id. § 5.106. In addition, a discharged employee is granted the right to bring a civil
action for recovery of lost wages and reinstatement. Id. § 5.202(6). See generally Johnson,
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code and the Credit Problems of Low Income Consumers,
37 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1117 (1969); Note, Garnishment Under the Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act, supra note 101.
The Consumer Credit Study Commission was created in Virginia in 1970 to investigate
the U.C.C.C. and other present laws relating to consumer credit. The 1974 report of the
commission recommended against adoption of the U.C.C.C. or any of its versions primarily
1980]
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states32 6 are available as cogent models to guide the Virginia Code
Commission in this necessary task.
CHARLES J. NABIT
because adoption would not produce the uniformity of the laws among the several states
that the U.C.C.C. was intended to foster. To date, only nine states have adopted the
U.C.C.C. in its entirety. The Commission recommended instead only piecemeal changes to
the existing legislation. See REPORT OF THE CONSUMER CREDIT COMMISSION, VA. S. Doc. No.
20 (1974).
326. See, e.g., S.C. CODE §§ 37-4-101 to 6-610 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1979). The South
Carolina consumer code prohibits wage garnishment for debts arising from consumer credit
sales, consumer leases, or consumer loans. Id. § 37-5-104.
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